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Thailand's Isthmus of Kra connects the Malay Peninsula with
southern Thailand and Burma. Sixty miles in width at its
narrowest point, the Kra Isthmus, over time, has been proposed
as a site for the location of a canal connecting the South China
Sea with the Indian Ocean. The impact that a completed Kra
Canal would have on U.S. Naval policy in the Indian Ocean, in
support of specific national , interests , was analyzed with respect
to the advantages and costs that would result from U.S. participa-
tion in the construction and operation of the canal. The minimal
advantages offered by the canal ever the existing passages through
the Malay Peninsula- Indonesian Archipelago Barrier are outweighed
by the costs that accrue, from U.S. support of the canal, such
that it is jjnpracticai and unnecessary for the United States to
pursue this foreign policy in support of U.S. national interests
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The Isthmus of Kra separates the Gulf of Siam and the Bay
of Bengal, extending southward from the southernmost confluence
of the Thailand and Burma borders to join together with the
Malay Peninsula. The Malay Peninsula is at its narrowest at
the Kra Isthmus, and for centuries this has been proposed as
a site for a canal connecting the South China Sea with the
Indian Ocean. In 1972 the canal issue received substantial
attention, not only from Southeast Asian nations, but also from
non-area interested parties. The effect that the Kra Canal
would have on U.S. Naval policy in the Indian Ocean in support
of United States national interests will be the subject of
this thesis.
A. FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
Within the broad concept of foreign policy- -bounded by
the constraints imposed by its own perception of national
interest—United States foreign policy directs American actions
so that specific foreign policy objectives might be achieved
in support of these, national interests. As international
political dynamics alter the perspectives of national interests,
foreign policy planners must make necessary adjustments to

maintain consistency between national interests and foreign
policy. The dynamics of the military and political environment
within the Indian Ocean since the Second World War have changed
the American perception of its national interests in this area,
and have brought about a concomitant reappraisal of American
foreign policy.
Given the context of specific national interests and foreign
policy objectives within the Indian Ocean, a series of detailed
alternative plans to achieve these objectives can be prepared
in order to provide a series of choices of action from which
to determine the most appropriate response in the presence of
the international and domestic environments. These alternative
programs to achieve foreign policy objectives in specific areas
must not of themselves neglect the whole of American foreign
policy, nor the specific environment within which they are to
be implemented. Rather, they must carefully balance the
relative importance of the national interest objectives in
this specific area with worldwide national security objectives.
Moreover, national interest gains from the implementation of
the foreign policy must include the credit or debit of the
international community in general, and the Indian Ocean in




American foreign policy since 1971 has vaguely attempted
to adhere to the tenets of the Nixon Doctrine. Although no
longer in a position himself to direct foreign policy, the
former President's State Department bureaucracy remains intact,
and there is no reason to believe that the Nixon Doctrine is
not still applicable.
"Current U. S. policy in Asia is based on the Nixon
Doctrine V7hich is generally thought to counsel limited
American involvement, indirect security support for
friendly countries, reduced bilateral economic assistance
commitments and a 'stand down, stand back' local posture. "*-
This paper will present a Nixon Doctrine approach to American
national interests in the Indian Ocean, and will offer a specific
foreign policy alternative in support of those, national interests,
This thesis will examine the proposed canal through Thailand's
Isthmus of Kra. United States support for the canal could
provide some benefits in terms of commercial shipping between-
port transit times, and a more responsive access route for
military units between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, however, a certain number of liabilities from
such U.S. support of the canal would be incurred, which might
overshadow the benefits that would accrue from the canal's
Wayne Wilcox, The Emergenc e of Bangladesh (Washington D.C.:




completion. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the benefits
and liabilities of a U.S . -supported Kra Canal in order to deter-
mine the application of a naval policy involving the Kra Canal
to support United States national interests in the Indian Ocean.
Owing to the complexities of the political, economic, and
military environments within the Indian Ocean, and the limited
scope, of this paper's hypothesis, it will be necessary to assume
specific national interests in the Indian Ocean area. This
paper will be an area study of limited scope: the area of
concentration will not be that area which is of ultimate concern,
but rather the specific area which is directly concerned with
the hypothesis under study. The assumptions of national interest
represent a general consensus of the bibliographical material.
They do not presume to describe existing national interest
objectives, nor normatively predict what those national interests
should be. Rather, they represent potential objectives which at
some time may be present.
B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Indian Ocean prior to 1947 was basically a British area
of influence and control. However, the staggering military and
economic losses sustained by Great Britain during World War Two,
coupled with the growing worldwide tide against the policies of
colonialism, resulted in the independence of India and Pakistan,
12

and a general lessening of Britain's foreign policy "east of
Suez." As the British reduced their military strength and
political control within the Indian Ocean, to an almost complete
withdrawal in 1971, the littoral of the Indian Ocean saw them-
selves as filling the power vacuum evacuated by the British.
The naval strength of the littoral states was extremely weak.
Indeed, even were they to form an alliance and unite their
naval forces, they would not comprise anything more than a
limited coastal defense force. The littoral states recognized
their military weaknesses, and could accurately foresee the
consequences if a major naval power were to establish itself
in the British Indian Ocean vacuum.
The United States emerged from the Second World War with
an expanded view of national interests and a foreign policy
that would assume global proportions. National interests, as
perceived by the United States, would include the Indian Ocean
and its littoral. Worldwide priorities kept national interests
and foreign policy within the Indian Ocean at a low level in
the immediate post-war years; the United States did not
immediately replace the gradually withdrawing British naval
forces. American perceptions of national interests were poten-
tially challenged by the introduction of a Soviet Naval detach-
ment into the Indian Ocean on 22 March 1968. The size and
13

duration of the Soviet deployments into the area have increased
following the initial deployment.
American foreign policy makers had to assay this potential
threat to United States national interests and project a
response commensurate with the perceived gravity of the threat
to its national interests, while accommodating if possible
the political attitudes of the Indian Ocean littoral.
Although the problem as broadly defined concerns United
States national interests within the Indian Ocean, and the
perceived threats to these interests, the more specific problem
to be addressed by this study relates to naval objectives within
the Indian Ocean as directed by foreign policy in support of
national interests. If the national interests can be assumed
and held constant, then the specific tactics employed by the
United States to achieve the national interest objectives would
be exposed and subject to analysis.
C. HYPOTHESIS
The United States Navy can effectively pursue American
national interests and support American foreign policy within
the Indian Ocean without stationing a major task force, nor
acquiring a major operating base in the area. Naval resources
required to effect United States naval policy would be drawn
from the Seventh Fleet. The United States should actively
14

support Thailand in the planning and construction of a canal
across the Kra Isthmus. This canal could provide Seventh Fleet
naval units with a geographically strategic point-of-entry into
the Eay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean and could facilitate
logistical support of naval units operating in the Indian Ocean,
Specifically, the hypothesis that this paper will evaluate
is: The United States should support the construction of the
proposed Kra Canal so that Seventh Fleet naval units could
rapidly respond to political-military activities within the
Indian Ocean, in support of American national interests, as an
alternative to stationing a major task force, or acquiring a
major operating base within the area.
15

II. THE KRA CANAL
i
Ocean access to the eastern Indian Ocean must pass through
the geographic barrier of the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian
Archipelago, or bypass this barrier to the south, by routes
either north or south of Australia. Alternatives to these
existing access routes would have to be dug through the
Indonesia-Malay Barrier. The impetus for such an undertaking
would come from a desire to have a shorter, more expeditious
access to the Indian Ocean, or, by the closing of the existing
accesses to all or certain categories of vessels.
The Kra Canal, a proposed canal across Thailand's Kra
Isthmus, is one potential alternative ocean access to the
eastern Indian Ocean. If constructed, the canal would reduce
the distance between the Gulf of Siara and the Indian Ocean.
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that a completed Kra Canal
would provide a rapid access capability to the Indian Ocean
for United States Seventh Fleet units, rather than stationing
a permanent task force, or acquiring a major operating base,
within the Indian Ocean.
The construction of the Kra Canal is deeply involved in the
international relations character of Southeast Asia, and extends
outward to include nearly every country with ocean-oriented
16

interests in this area. The geography of the Indonesia-Malay
Barrier is a constricting element on the choices for a location
of a canal. Furthermore, the foreign policies of the nations
involved will influence the nature of the existing passages
through the barrier, as well as proposed new passages. The Kra
Isthmus Canal has long-established historical roots, and,
although never constructed, has on many occasions progressed
to the initial planning phases. The Kra Canal would have a
varied impact on transits through the Barrier, depending upon
the political circumstances of the time.
Construction of the canal is inevitably tied up in the
political structure of Thailand. It will be necessary to
review the current political relationships between the United
States and Thailand in order to understand the potential for
United States support of a canal through the Isthmus of Kra.
A. THE GEOGRAPHIC BARRIER
The arm of the Malay Peninsula extending south from
Thailand and Burma is met by the expansive Indonesia Archipelago,
limiting ocean access to the Indian Ocean through the land mass.
Three major ocean access routes are used to gain entry into
the Ocean. Most prominent of these is the combined Singapore




Each of the access routes through the Barrier, and the
Kra Canal, are narrow in width and extremely shallow. It is
recognized that in the event one nation or alliance of nations
determine it necessary to interdict ocean travel through the
Barrier, it can be easily accomplished with only limited mili-
tary technology and naval assets. As only three natural breaks
exist in the Barrier, with the remote possibility of a fourth
in the Kra Canal, it is likely that during a time of armed
conflict or an intense crisis involving naval transits through
the Barrier, all of the ocean routes can be easily sealed.
With this in mind, the trans -Barrier passages will be examined
in the context of an environment short of overt aggression
against the passages, which would render any Barrier transit
impossible.
1. The Straits of Malacca
The Malacca Strait is approximately 500 miles in length.
separating the Malay Peninsula from the Indonesian Island of
Sumatra. Singapore Strait is sixty miles long. The width of
the western section of the Malacca Straits is about ten miles;
the eastern end is about twenty miles in width. At their
narrowest, the Straits are two and one-half miles wide. The
depth for navigational purposes is twelve fathoms, or about
72 feet. Scattered along its length are numerous shoals,
complicating the navigational process. Coupled with the
18

precision navigation requirements is the growing problem of
traffic density. In 1970 it was reported that 37,000 ships
passed through the Straits, an increase of 5,000 over the
previous year. Not only has traffic volume increased, but
also the size of transiting ships has increased. The emphasis
of Middle East crude oil transported eastward from the Persian
Gulf has given a dramatic rise in the number of supertankers,
dangerously approaching the limiting navigational draft,
transiting the Straits.
That the Malacca Straits shipping route between the
South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is 800 miles shorter than
the next closest strait supports the prominence of the Malacca
Straits. Commercially, it is financially advantageous to
minimize between-port transit time, and as more commercial
vessels operate between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the
volume of traffic using the Straits will increase.
The Malacca Straits also provide transiting naval units
with a tactically more advantageous access across the Barrier
than either of the two more lengthy routes. Not only does this
apply to the United States Seventh Fleet naval units, but
^Captain Edward F. Oliver, U.S. Coast Guard, "Malacca:




also to the Pacific Fleet units of the Soviet Union based at
Vladivostok. Both navies use these Straits to support their
naval interests in the Indian Ocean. The Malacca Straits,
however, are extremely vulnerable to shipping interdiction
measures, owing to their narrow width and shallow depth. In.
a time of crisis either of the great powers could easily seal
off this passage. Moreover, a third party, with unsophisticated
technology and limited naval assets could also block ocean
traffic through the Straits.
2. Sunda Strait
A second passage through the Barrier is located at the
southeastern tip of Sumatra. The Sunda Strait is 450 miles
south of the Malacca Straits, and is approximately 800 miles
longer in transit length from the South China Sea to the
Indian Ocean. Unlike the Malacca Straits, Indonesia occupies
both sides of the Sunda Strait. This passage is quite narrow
and short in length. It does not have the traffic flow as does
Malacca.
3. Lombok Strait
The Lombok Strait is 600 miles east of the Sunda Strait.
It too passes through islands of the Indonesian Archipelago.
The Strait is navigationally wider than either the Malacca or
Sunda Straits. However, the Lombok Strait adds an additional
one thousand miles to the. transit distance to the South China
20

Sea-Indian Ocean route. Because of the wider navigational width
of this Strait, the very large petroleum-carrying supertankers
of 300,000 tons or more use this route instead of the more
shallow Malacca Straits or the narrow Sunda Straits. Of the
three natural passages through the barrier, the Lombok Strait
is the most easily navigatable, with the major disadvantage
being the excessive transit distance involved.
4. The Australian Passages
Alternative access to the eastern Indian Ocean, other
than through the Indonesia-Malay Barrier, must necessarily pass
either north or south of Australia. This routing of vessels
transiting from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean is extremely
lengthy. However, for vessels allied on the side of Australia,
logistic and maintenance support bases can be utilized, on the
northern shore at Darwin, or Melbourne in the south and Fremantle
and Perth to the west. The support facilities notwithstanding,
the transit routes around Indonesia, north of Australia, are
of such excessive length as to render them impractical and
unnecessary, unless all other access routes to the eastern
Indian Ocean are closed.
B. THE POLITICAL BARRIER
The three Straits through the Indonesia-Malay Barrier have
recently become important with respect to international free-
passage and territorial waters. If it is determined that the
21

Straits are within territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia,
a political barrier through the archipelago and Malay Peninsula
could be erected. Restricted passage to commercial merchant
shipping and military units would have a significant impact in
the international community.
In November, 1971, the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia
announced that the Strait of Malacca, separating those two
countries, would thereafter be considered territorial waters.
At its narrowest width the Malacca Strait extends 24 miles
between Malaysia and Indonesia. In claiming that their terri-
torial waters extend twelve miles from their coastline, a joint
agreement by both countries to claim half of the Strait as
territorial waters would enable them to collectively control
the Strait. It was announced by both nations that the Strait
would be closed to all "outsized tankers above 200,000 dead-
weight tons and to all warships of any tonage which had not made
application for, and received permission to, transit the Strait
3
of Malacca."
Several self-centered underlying reasons exist which support
the joint Indonesia-Malaysia claims. First, the Strait is not
deep enough to accommodate the supertankers of 200,000 tons or
3Lawrence Griswold, "Bypassing Malacca," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceed ings, June, 1973, p. 106.
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more. Several tankers have already run aground, and the danger
of widespread oil pollution is real. Moreover, ships of the
supertanker size have sluggish maneuvering capabilities, which
is extremely dangerous in the narrow confines of the channel,
especially when considering the volume of traffic running through
it. Second, Indonesia and Malaysia are concerned about their
national security. "For some time Indonesian leaders have
warily watched the expansion of Soviet Naval power in the
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean." The Soviet Naval units in
the Indian Ocean usually come from their Pacific Squadron,
through the Malacca Straits. After 1971, with United States
Naval activity increasing in the Indian Ocean, both great
powers were using the Straits for military purposes. Indonesia
feared the presence of great power navies within the inner line
of their defense.
At present, the political Barrier is penetratable. Super-
tankers which do not exceed limiting navigational drafts transit
the Straits. United States and Soviet warships freely use the
Straits to gain access to the Indian Ocean. However, Indonesia
and Malaysia have assumed a position that could place the
Malacca Straits within territorial waters. Under International
z .. "S. Iskandar, "Malaysia and Indonesia, A Family Affair,
Far Eastern Economic Review
,
15 April 1972, p. 18.

Law, territorial waters limits access through the waterway to
innocent passage, the definition of which rests with the nation
or nations claiming territorial coverage of the waterway. The
joint claim of territorial waters status for the Malacca Straits,
with the inherent right under International Law for these
nations to permit innocent passage, would enable Indonesia and
Malaysia to determine national security threats posed by the
various categories of surface warships. In effect, Indonesia
or Malaysia could prohibit the transit of warships through the
Malacca Straits under territorial waters status, if either
recognizes a potential security threat. In addition to the
Malacca Straits, Indonesia has claimed internal waters status
for the Sunda and Lombok Straits, which under international
agreement precludes the right of innocent passage.
These Indonesian and Malaysian claims to the international
status of the three major access routes through their combined
geographical barrier are the basis for speculative concern.
Whether legal or illegal under International Law, whether
enforced or unenforced, the assertions by these Barrier countries
have served notice to the world that there exists the possibility
of the imposition of limitations on vessels transiting the
Straits. The consequences of these limitations could be damaging
to the nations dependent on trade through the Barrier, as well as
24

to those nations concerned with the naval activity within the
Indian Ocean.
A further consideration must be noted: the traditional
policy of China to exclude outsiders from forming alliances or
establishing bases in Southeast Asian nations. If China were
eventually able to influence the governments of Indonesia and
Malaysia, it is possible that China would restrict, at the
least, naval activity, if not merchant shipping, through the
Barrier. As China increases its naval strength and national
prestige in the international community, the potential for
Chinese dominance in Southeast Asia increases apace.
The political barrier is not recognized by either the
United States or the Soviet Union. The United States Navy's
interest in maintaining the international character of the
Strait was set forth clearly in April, 1972, when Admiral
Thomas L. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated
"We should have and must have the freedom to go through, under,
and over the Malacca Strait.' The Soviet Union has repeatedly
declared the Straits open for passage of all merchant and naval
shipping.
In consideration of the international legal viewpoint on
the status of the Sunda and Lombok Straits, the majority of the





international community does not recognize "internal waters"
status of the Straits; nor do they recognize the limited
"territorial waters" status of the Malacca Straits. The
United States has assumed the position that the Malacca Straits
represent a strategic and traditional access route to the Indian
Ocean. Territorial waters status of these Straits with the
innocent passage constraints would handcuff United States
nautical interests through the Straits.
C. THE KRA CANAL
1. Background
The Indonesia -Malay Barrier between the Gulf of Siam
and the Indian Ocean remains an obstacle to shipping traffic.
When sailing vessels plied the trade-routes across the globe,
merchants were forever looking for shorter and more expedient
routes. One especially important trade relationship existed
between Europe and the colonial empires in South and Southeast
Asia, and beyond to China and Japan. The Suez Canal, constructed
in the middle decades of the 1800' s, significantly reduced the
distance to the Asian empires. That the Suez Canal was con-
structed gave proof that nineteenth century technology would
support canal construction where feasible. The sixty mile width
of the Isthmus of Kra offered the only area along the Barrier
where a canal could realistically be carved. It is logical,
26

therefore, to understand the early exploration of the Isthmus
of Kra as a potential site for a canal through the Barrier.
Surveys were conducted along the Isthmus during the
nineteenth century. The British examined the area in mid-
century, and determined a canal was feasible. However, political
and economic complications intervened. First, the Isthmus
belonged to the Kingdom of Siam--the only nation in Southeast
Asia to remain free from European colonialism. In order for
the canal to be constructed, Siam would have to be an approving
party. Furthermore, the canal would by-pass the Malacca Straits
and the British colony of Singapore. Singapore's economy was
heavily dependent upon the merchant vessels using the colony as
a logistic and maintenance base. These restraints will have
recurrent appearances in the history of the Kra Canal.
The French became interested in the canal during the
latter portion of the nineteenth century when they were estab-
lishing their French-Indochina colonial empire. French interest
in the canal received a reaction from Great Britain, who wanted
to ensure the importance of Singapore along the Malacca route.
The Siamese King, however, did not acquiesce to pressure from
either France or Great Britain, and neither was granted canal
rights. During this time frame, Ferdinand de Lesseps, of Suez
and Panama Canal fame, "figured prominently in one of the most
27

important projections for connecting the Indian Ocean with the
South China Sea across the Isthmus of Kra. MD
The concept of the Kra Canal reappeared at various times
through the early 1900' s. The French and British were co-dominant
parties in the beginning, but French interest fell considerably
by the turn of the century. Britain indicated an occasional
interest, but the impact of a Kra Canal on Singapore inhibited
any real consideration of the canal. Following World War Two,
the British "imposed upon the Siamese Government a clause in a
formal agreement in 1946 wherein the Siamese agreed not to cut
any canal across the territory of Siam to connect the Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Siam without first obtaining the consent
of the Government of the Kingdom." Writing in a paper on the
history of the Kra Canal, Professor Herbert B. Smith of Pomona
College reported that the British rescinded this restriction in
the 1960's. 8
2. Present Status of the Canal
Early in July 1972, the ruling National Executive
Council in Thailand approved tentative plans for the construction
"Herbert B. Smith, "Historic Proposals for a Kra Canal:
Their Impact on International Relations in Southeast Asia,"
(paper presented to 1974 Annual Meeting of Asian Studies on the






of a canal across the Isthmus of Kra. The revival of the Kra
Canal issue was initiated by the now-defunct Council without
the participation of other countries. As reported in the
July 16, 1972 New York Times , the canal was to be approximately
120 yards wide, with five navigational locks. The proposed
canal was to run about 95 miles, from a bay in Phangnga province
on the west coast of the Isthmus to another bay in Surat-Thani
1province on the Gulf of Siam. The original proposal called
for a maximum navigational draft of 90 feet, accommodating
vessels up to 100,000 deadweight tons.
In December, 1972, the Royal Thai government contracted
with two American firms to conduct feasibility studies of a
canal across the Kra Isthmus. The contractors were Tippetts-
Abbett-McCarthy-Stratton of New York, and LTV of Dallas, Texas. 11
Various possible routes were studied along the Isthmus, with
the most attractive route between Krabi on the west and Surat-
Thani on the east coast. It was proposed that the canal should
be approximately 100 feet below sea-level, "and about a quarter
o
"Thailand Plans Canal Across Kra Isthmus," New York Times
,
16 July 1972, p. 19.
10Michael Hornsby, "The Ill-fated Plan to Link Two Oceans,"
London Times
, 3 August 1972, p. 16.





of a mile in width- -enough room for two one-million-ton tankers
to pass abreast, with a concrete-surfaced island between the
ship lanes, and with parallel trans -isthmian roads on both
12
sides." The Wall Street Journal reported in December, 1973,
that the canal would cost as much as eight billion dollars,
with a construction time of up to ten years. J
Preliminary arrangements for the Kra Canal were serious
enough, and it appeared the canal project would move earnestly
towards reality. However, history seemed to catch up with the
canal efforts. "Unexpected events continue to intrude, and
the energy crisis of 1973-74 and the Thai political upheavals
of October, 1973. have inevitably posed new question marks
regarding the possibilities for actual construction of the
canal." Today the Kra Canal is once again a dormant issue.
"The present government has so many serious and urgent problems,
says a man close to the Kra Canal project, I doubt if they'll
have time to schedule this."
12Ibid.
Plans to Cut a Canal Across Thailand Appear Shelved Until
Late Next Year," Wall Street Journal
,
31 December 1973, p. 1.
Smith, op_. cit .
, p. 30.
5
"Plans to Cut a Canal Across Thailand Appear Shelved Until
Late. Next Year," Wall Street Journa l, 31 December 1973, p. 1.
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3. Motivating; Factors for the Kra Canal
The impetus for the construction of the Kra Canal in
the sailing-ship days was provided by the desire to reduce
transit time and distance between the western Pacific and the
Indian Ocean. This motivating purpose prevails today, but the
complexities of the international economic and political environ-
ments have added new dimensions to the situation.
Renewed interest in the Kra Canal by Thailand was led
by K. Y. Chow, a Chinese-born Thai.
"In Thailand, 'K.Y. ' represents the industrial energy,
the wealth and power which, in the United States, might
be expressed by Rockefeller or Ford. Chow and his
supporters felt that such a canal was 'urgently necessary
in November, 1971, when Malaysia and Indonesia announced
that the Strait of Malacca, separating those two nations,
would henceforth be considered territorial waters'. "^
The Indonesia-Malaysia decision to limit the passage of
supertankers and warships through the Strait has alarming impli-
cations. Japan is the world's biggest importer of crude oil,
with an annual consumption running at about 200 million tons.
This is expected to rise to 500 million by 1980, and 700
million by 1985. Japan imports 90 percent of its crude oil from
17the Middle East. In order that the oil can be transported
16C.L. Sulzberger, "A Big New Dream in Asia," New York Times ,
31 December 1972, IV, p. 9.




more economically and quickly, the "supertanker" was constructed,
The only alternative route to the Malacca Straits are the Sunda
and Lombok Straits, adding at least five extra transit days and
considerable cost to the voyage. The Kra Canal, as planned,
would not only offer an acceptable alternative to the Malacca
Straits, but also reduce transit times and shipping costs
through the Barrier.
While Japan would be most affected by a limitation on
the size of ships transiting the Straits, Japan favors the
construction of a pipeline across the Kra Isthmus, where oil
would be pumped across, rather than shipped through, the Kra
Isthmus. Nevertheless, "The general feeling among Japanese oil
men and tanker operators is that the pipeline will not become
overwhelmingly attractive for them unless the Malaysians and
Indonesians carry out their threat to restrict passage through
18
the Malacca Strait."
Even though Japan is not a strong proponent of the Kra
Canal, a completed canal, large enough to accommodate the super-
tankers of 500,000 ton size, would be to Japan's advantage.
Japan, as the party most dependent on innocent passage
through the Barrier, could financially support the canal's




of its vital crude oil from the Middle East by supertankers of
300,000 deadweight tons, through the Lombok Strait. The Kra
Canal would not substantially increase the import of crude oil
owing to the existing size of the supertanker fleet. Economic
reasons alone do not strongly infer that the Kra Canal is
necessary or remunerative.
Motivation for the Kra Canal project was primarily
economic, as demonstrated by the Thai National Executive Council's
decision to survey the Isthmus for a possible canal following
the Indonesia-Malaysia agreement on the Malacca Straits. How-
ever, the Kra Canal has an inherent military potential as well,
although the potential has not yet been realized. If the canal
were to be constructed, it would almost have to have financial
and technological support from a highly-developed, industrialized
nation. The most likely candidates would be the Soviet Union
and the United States. It logically follows that if either of
these great powers provides assistance to Thailand in the
construction of the canal, they would receive in return certain
privileges, perhaps economic or military, or both.
A potential scenario having the Straits of Malacca
closed to the passage of warships, and a Kra Canal open to one
of the great powers, but not the other, would give to that
power having access to the canal a decisive tactical advantage
for passage through the Barrier. While this scenario is highly
33

speculative, it is nevertheless a possibility and cannot be
overlooked if the Kra Canal issue is once again revived.
4. Construction
The Kra Canal as proposed would be a mammoth project,
present day technology notwithstanding. Excavation of the
canal by conventional measures might be prohibitively expensive,
even by the great powers. The alternative to conventional
technology is nuclear. When Dr. Edward Teller conceived the
idea of a nuclear fissionable device, he had in mind peaceful
uses of nuclear fission, such as the excavation of harbors or
canals. In his support for the canal, K. Y Chow envisioned the
use of nuclear blasting to save time and money. "He argues
that precedents for such peaceful use of thermonuclear power
appear to exist not only in the United States 'Plowshare'
testing program, but in reports of a vast project said to be
19
underway in the Soviet Union."
It is conceivable that nuclear blasting could be effec-
tively used in the construction of the canal, with considerable
savings of time and expense. It is doubtful that conventional
construction of the canal would be financially feasible. This
would limit the number of possible countries to assist in the
construction of the canal to those with a nuclear capability,
19Sulzberger, loc . cit .
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and, more specifically, to those countries who have refined the
state-of-the-art to a high level. At present, only the Soviet
Union and the United States have the potential to undertake
this type of nuclear excavation.
5. Summary
The Kra Canal has a long history of surveys and projec-
tions, but action no further than the initial planning stages.
It is readily evident from the geography of Southeast Asia that
the Kra Isthmus is the only conceivable location for a man-made
access through the Indonesia-Malay Peninsula Barrier. A completed
canal could have economic, political and military ramifications,
not only for the Southeast Asian nations, but also for all
countries whose merchant and naval vessels operate in the area.
Construction of the Kra Canal faces economic and tech-
nological challenges. An estimated cost of eight billion
dollars, and construction time of approximately ten years, is
constantly threatened by rising worldwide inflation and esca-
lating prices. Additionally, nuclear construction techniques,
while saving substantial construction time, have not been
approved by the world community. It is doubtful that nuclear
excavation methods would be countenanced by the international
environment. By reverting to conventional means of construction,
an inordinate amount of construction time would be involved.
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If the Kra Canal were to be constructed, it would almost
certainly have to have technological and financial support from
one of the great powers. In a quid-pro-quo arrangement, that
power which assists Thailand in the construction of the canal
would most likely gain access rights to the canal, and because
of its potential military application, would probably have
partial or complete operational control of the canal.
Renewed and serious interest in the Kra Canal, either
by Thailand or other nations; motivated by economic or military
considerations, will have an impact on the naval policies with
respect to passage through the Barrier. That a non-U. S.
supported Kra Canal cculd be detrimental to United States
security interests within the Indian Ocean must be considered
if the issue again surfaces. Furthermore, a U.S . -supported
canal could threaten Soviet interests in the area by creating
a tactical imbalance, if Soviet Naval units were prohibited
from using the canal. The international implications of a
completed Kra Canal are considerable; a fourth passage through
the Barrier will save transit time and money, while straining
international relations of all nations affected.
D. THE UNITED STATES AND THAILAND
The only feasible location for a canal through the Indonesia-
Malay Barrier is across the Isthmus of Kra. The construction
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of a canal, sponsored totally by Thailand with the assistance
of private financing, or by a technologically and financially
capable nation or group of nations, must ultimately have the
support of Thailand. If the proposed Kra Canal were to be
built with United States assistance, the political climate in
Thailand would have to be accommodating to the policies and
objectives of the United States, The past relationships
between Thailand and the United States notwithstanding, the
current political climate in Thailand must be determined in
order to view the acceptability of a U.S. supported canal.
Beyond the existing political relationships between Thailand
and the United States stands the possibility of the People's
Republic of China exercising influence in Indochina. With roots
in Dynastic China, the present Chinese government advocates a
hands-off policy in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the Chinese
would like to prohibit foreign nations from establishing bases
in the area, and maintain the area free from Western alliances.
A United States supported Kra Canal would not be compatible with
Communist Chinese security objectives.
1 • Present Un ited States -Thailand Relationships
Thailand, allied with Japan during the Second World War,
shifted their political allegiance following the war to the side
of the United States. A member of SEATO, Thailand remained
close to the United States during the Cold War and in the initia"
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phases of active participation by the United States in Vietnam.
The United States used Thailand's strategic geographical posi-
tion during the Vietnam War to locate air bases. Reconnaissance
and bombing missions were flown from aircraft based in Thailand.
B-52 bombers and SR-71 spyplanes used Thailand's airbases for
operations in Vietnam. The government of Thailand, however,
began to change its political orientation in the early 1970' s,
just as it had done during World War Two. Thailand is vividly
aware of the Communist Chinese policy of no foreign bases nor
political alliances with Western powers in Indochina. Moreover,
Thailand could readily see the declining U.S. political strength
in Vietnam.
In May of 1971, the Wall Street Journal reported: "Thai
leaders, less and less sure of a long term U.S. presence in
Southeast Asia, seek better relations with North Vietnam, China,
20
maybe North Korea." This 1971 statement is unusual, given
that the United States airplanes were conducting air raids in
North Vietnam from bases in Thailand. "Bangkok declares U.S.
21bases are in Thailand only for the War's duration," " the
article continued. In the spring of 1972 massive bombing runs
20
"U.S. -Ally Thailand Begins Warming Up to Asian Communist




were made on North Vietnam. Thailand again questioned the
presence of U.S. bases. "Their presence causes friction with
Thailand's neighbors, plus internal political problems. Even-
99tually the United States will probably be invited out.'
Thailand's political orientation did not take a dramatic
change. Rather, a slow move from the Western alliance was indi-
cated. A sudden shift to China, and the removal of all U.S.
base«s in Thailand, did not seem politically attractive. China
was reluctant to see a sudden end to U.S. bases in Thailand.
"While keen to see an end to American military intervention in
the Far East, China must recognize that a sudden power vacuum
in the area could lead to increased Soviet influence. A
slow but persistent move to end U.S. bases in Thailand would
best serve the interests of Thailand and China.
The political climate in Thailand took a major change
in October, 1973. Military rule was overthrown, and replaced
by a civilian government. The change in governments did not
offer a significant shift in the Thai political orientation.
William Hartley, writing in the Wall Street Journal, said:
"There is little immediate worry, in the opinion of informed
"After Vietnam: U.S. -ally Thailand Grows Nervous About
its Future," Wall Street Journal , 10 November 1972, p. 1.
23David Bonavia, "China Hopes for Removal of Americar
Threat," London Times , 15 February 1973, p. 6.
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sources here, about the future of the substantial U.S. military
forces in this country." However, in January, 1974, the new
Foreign Minister of Thailand, Charunphan Isarangkun, emphasized
a reorientation of American emphasis in Thailand, from military
to economic and technical cooperation. Prime Minister Charunphan
said, "Thailand's future relations with the U.S. will have to be
modified and adapted to changing circumstances. During the past
decade one characteristic of our relations with the United States
has been an over-emphasis on military cooperation. This needs
to be adjusted in order to achieve a more truly balanced rela-
tionship."
At this point, the Thai foreign policy seems to be split.
The new civilian government indicated that U.S. air bases would
not be ejected until the war in Indochina was concluded. How-
ever, use of U.S. bases for purposes other than air activity in
Indochina would not be acceptable to Thai leaders. Prime
Minister Charunphan clarified Thailand's position on the
American air bases. The Thai government "had no intentions of
24William D. Hartley, "Bangkok Likely to Maintain Close
Ties with U.S.; Main Tasks Facing New Regime Appear Domestic,"
Wall Street Journal , 17 October 1973, p. 42.
z5Norman Peagam, "In the US Orbit for the Moment," Far
Eastern Economic Review, 18 October 1974, Focus, p. 3.
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seeking large-scale withdrawal of United States military forces
from Thai bases until it was satisfied that war was ended in
this part of the world.""
If the Thai government felt strong enough about the
threat to their security from the war in Vietnam to allow U.S.
air bases within their country, they took steps to preclude
their involvement in other areas of South Asia. "In July (1974)
the Thai government formally asked the U.S. to stop flying
reconnaissance missions over the Indian Ocean from U-Tapao
? 7Airbase in Thailand. ' This limitation followed a statement
by U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger that, "B-52's
9 ft
based in Thailand might be employed to patrol the Indian Ocean.""
Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan said that the reconnaissance
flights "Contradicted Thailand's support for the U.S. resolution
declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace; that they under-
mined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations declaration on
29peace and neutrality."
26james F. Clarity, "Thai Urges Soviet to Help Bring Peace
to Indochina," New York Times , 17 January 1974, p. 3.
^'Peagam, 1oc . cit .
2
°Jidbhand Kambhu, "Uncertain Direction," Far Eastern
Economic Review
, 8 April 1974, p. 17.
29Peagam, loc . cit.
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The apparent dichotomy in Thailand's foreign policy
stems from its perception of its national interests. The war
in Vietnam and throughout Indochina poses a real threat to
Thailand's security, owing to the geographical proximity. For
this reason, there remains in Thailand about 350 U.S. airplanes,
30
and 27,500 Americans. On the other hand, Thailand recognizes
the interests of the Chinese, and does not want to provoke a
deleterious response from China if Thailand were to support U.S.
forces for Indian Ocean operations. Thailand recognizes the
threat from within Indochina, but does not attach a similar
threat potential from the Indian Ocean. As a result, the
Thais allow U.S. forces to operate against insurgents in Indo-
china, but pursue a non- involvement policy with respect to the
Indian Ocean.
2 . Future United States -Thailand Relations
Under the surface there appears to be a gradual re-
orientation in the direction of Thailand's foreign policy. The
Thais are no longer strong allies of the United States, nor
have they shifted allegiance to China or the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, Thai policy is not vacillating between the two.
On 3 March 1975 Thailand's Defense Minister, Thawit Seniwong,
30Norman Peagam, "The American Shield Remains," Far East ern
Economic Review , 20 September 1974, p. 14.
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indicated that Thailand was going to "call for the withdrawal
of all American forces stationed in the country within 18
31
months." Seniwong included in his statement the caveat that
the withdrawal of U.S. forces would be held in abeyance if a
critical military situation existed. This statement is con-
sistent with Thailand's concern with insurgent military activity
in Indochina, along with a lack of similar concern with out-of-
area military activity. Although the Thai civilian government,
led by Prime Minister Seni Pramoj , did not receive a majority
in a vote of confidence held two days later, the prevalent
attitude in Thailand remains suspect of the U.S. military-
presence. At the same time, Thailand has begun to establish
closer ties with the Soviet Union. Thai Foreign Minister
Charunphan said of the Soviets, "As regards the conflict in
Indochina in particular, we believe that the Soviet Union is
in a strong position to contribute to the restoration of peace
and harmony to the long suffering people living there, and
thereby contribute positively to the stability of the entire
region.""1 Relations with China also became more cordial
following the October 1973 coup. James Markham, writing in the
31
"Thailand to Ask U.S. Forces' Withdrawal," Monterey
Peninsula Herald
, 3 March 1975, p. 1.
-^Clarity, loc . cit.
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New York Times, indicated Thailand's political shift. "Thailand's
search for a more comfortable place in Southeast Asia—without
33heavy American protection, will probably continue apace."
Thailand is surrounded on the eastern half of its border
by countries deeply involved in national liberation movements,
mostly with a Communist base. The Chinese appear to be strongly
stimulating these movements. Thailand, by taking a position
least offensive to the Chinese, would probably mitigate the
liberation movements in their country.
Many factors contribute to Thailand's perception of its
national interests. The inability of the United States to
resolve the Vietnam Conflict, the intensity of national libera-
tion movements in Indochina, the potential dominance of China
once again in Southeast Asia, and the differences between the
Soviet Union and China are undoubtedly major factors. Trend
extrapolation from Thailand's recent past indicates a continued
shift away from the United States. Thailand knows the U.S.
needs its geographical location, for it is the only place where
air bases can be located for operations in Indochina. Moreover
,
Thailand's security policy in part: takes into account American
efforts against the revolutionary Communist movements in Laos,
33James M. Markham, "Thailand's Role in Asia," New York
Times
, 25 May 1974, p. 9.
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Cambodia, and Vietnam. Nevertheless, Thailand is also cognizant
of China's policy of non-support and alliance-free from Western
nations. These incompatible factors motivate Thailand's
dichotomous foreign policy- -to allow American bases to support
efforts in Indochina, and to pursue non- involvement in other
geographical areas.
E. SUMMARY
The Indonesia-Malay Peninsula Barrier to access between the
western Pacific and Indian Oceans has given special importance
to Thailand's Isthmus of Kra--for this narrow band of land
separating the two oceans offers the only potential area where
a canal might be constructed. The motivating factors for the
Kra Canal project have changed over the years, but the impact
of a completed Kra Canal on the international relations, economic
structure and military balance of nations involved, both geo-
graphically and politically, have remained influential factors.
Current emphasis for the Kra Canal is economically motivated.
The navigational size limitations on supertankers through the
Malacca Straits, coupled with the Indonesia-Malaysia threats to
limit the passage for certain size vessels through the Straits
prompt the search for a shorter route than around the eastern
end of the Indonesian Archipelago.
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Of lesser current importance, but with great potential, are
the military implications of the canal. If either the Soviet
Union, or the United States, could gain free access to, or
partial control of, the Kra Canal, they could more rapidly
introduce naval vessels into the Indian Ocean. Time savings
using the canal over the Malacca Straits is not significant
unless an urgent crisis requires an immediate response. How-
ever, if the Straits were closed to passage of all warships,
then the canal becomes tactically important to that nation
having access to the canal.
While the United States could determine that a canal might
not offer advantages to its naval operations within the Indian
Ocean, it still must project the advantages that a canal would
give to other nations if they supported the canal's construction
and obtained usage and control privileges. Such control of the
canal could threaten U.S. security objectives in the Ocean, so
that the U.S. might consider support of the canal project to
preclude an adversary power from gaining influence or control
of the canal.
The Kra Canal will become a reality only if Thailand agrees
to, and supports, its construction. This non- industrialized
nation, with only limited technological capabilities, would
need the support of a nation capable of building the canal.
However, in helping Thailand construct the canal in exchange for
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usage privileges and operation control, the supporting nation
must be politically acceptable to Thailand. Constraints on
Thailand come from China, who exercises considerable influence
in Southeast Asia. China's emphasis of no alliances or foreign
bases in the area contradict foreign power support with special
privileges for the canal.
The estimated construction costs of eight million dollars,
coupled with a completion date some ten years following initia-
tion of construction, are definite obstacles to overcome.
Estimates of construction costs will increase over time, and
the approximate construction time will also add to the ultimate
cost. The financial return on the canal investment must
necessarily support the initial costs of the canal. Furthermore
it is expected that ocean transportation will improve during
the anticipated time of construction, which could render the
canal obsolete before it becomes operational.
In order for the United States to become involved in the
construction of the Kra Canal, U.S . -Thailand relations must
be compatible with respect to the usage of the canal. The
present political climate in Thailand, together with their
apparent political shift away from the United States, does not





It is doubtful that the Kra Canal will ever become a
reality. Frustrated by the canal's impact on international
relations, and the increasing expense of construction, the
recurrent proposals for the canal have been unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, it is incorrect to automatically dismiss the




III. ASSUMED NATIONAL INTERESTS
Construction of a canal across Thailand's Isthmus of Kra
could possibly offer certain limited naval advantages over other
routes through the Barrier for the United States in pursuit of
national interests within the Indian Ocean. In order to analyze
the validity of a specific foreign policy in support of the
national interests, the national interests themselves must be
defined. Moreover, national interests change over time, so
that a definition of national interests for a specific time
period may not correspond to the interests for another time.
Consequently, this thesis will structure an assumed national
interest for the United States in the Indian Ocean, and analyze
the proposed foreign policy against this assumption.
A. OPERATIONALIZATIONS
1 . National Interests
The concept of "national interest" has been the subject
of many thoughtful and scholarly discussions. Different inter-
pretations of "national interest" have been proposed, and in
itself this concept is most complex and easily misunderstood.
For purposes of clarity within this paper, "national interests"
will be defined to the extent that its intended usage will be
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clearly understood, and interpreted with the same meaning by
every reader.
The traditional international relations definition of
national interest is perhaps best represented by Hans Morgenthau.
A more modern interpretation, but one which closely resembles
Morgenthau 1 s has been expressed by Frederick H. Hartman. In
defining "national interest," the basic, ideas of these two
authors will be synthesized into an operational definition.
Hartman defines the general meaning and scope of national
interest:
"National interests cover categories of desires on the
part of sovereign states that vary enormously from state
to state and from time to time. There is an irreducible
core for any state at any time. This core consists of
the 'vital' interests— those for which a state is normally
willing to fight immediately or ultimately. Such vital
interests include for all states, as a minimum, the
protection of their existing territory and the preserva-
tion of their prestige from a massive 'loss of face.' By
contrast, the less-than-vital or secondary interests cover
all the myriad desires of individual states which they would
like to attain but for which they will not fight. "^4
Morgenthau agrees on the idea of primary or secondary interests;
but to this he adds two additional dimensions: the degree of
permanance of the interest, and the degree of generality of the
interest. These two additional dimensions give the operational
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35Thomas W. Robinson, International Po licies and Foreign
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definition of "national interest" the property of changing over
time (permanence) and the degree to which the national interest
is applied in a specific geographical area, or the specificity
of the geographical area itself.
In order for a nation to develop its national interests,
it must first determine its perception of the international
political environment, and what role it will attempt to play in
this environment. A framework of national interests will be
developed to support its perceived role. This framework will
necessarily be constrained by the nation's ability to success-
fully pursue its national interests, and the real world's re-
action to the pursuit of these national interests.
National interests are rarely packaged in definitive
form by a nation for all other nations to observe. Rather, a
foreign policy is developed from that framework of national
interest which a nation has perceived to be. in consonance with
the real world and its role in the real world.
"Taken together, the vital and secondary interests of
states are important in international relations, because
they form the raw material out of which foreign policy
is made. An ideal foreign policy, once formulated, contains
a systematic selection of national interests in which in-
consistent interests have been weeded out, the interests
have been judged against one another in terms of priorities,
and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against
the estimated power and potential of the state to achieve
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those interests. A foreign policy at any one time will
therefore not contain all possible national interests, but
only those selected for implementation. JD
Other national actors in the international arena must
observe the whole of a specific nation's foreign policy, and
from this infer what that nation's guiding framework of national
interest consists of. The perception of the real world by a
nation, and its resultant foreign policy in support of its
national interest, combined with the individual inferences by
all nations of the meaning and intent of the foreign policy
promote the complexity of the international relations picture.
This complexity severely limits governments in assuming national
interests, or foreign policy, without regard for the real world.
Care must be exercised to ensure that the implementation of
foreign policy accurately reflects a nation's national interest
but does not conflict with other national interests that it
perceives to exist in the real world.
2. Foreign Policy
National interests provide the goals to which American
foreign policy must be oriented. Foreign policy drives the
diplomatic, economic, and military policies of a nation in the
international arena. Unlike national interests, which contain
0£




general policy goals, foreign policy must contend with many
external and internal factors in pursuit of the national
interest objectives, where numerous corridors leading to those
goals are available. Foreign policy is the means for ensuring
that national interests are adequately protected.
3. Major Task Force Within the Indian Ocean
The United States Navy has a permanent, Indian Ocean
naval component based at the former British naval base on the
Island of Bahrain. This naval unit consists of an amphibious
landing ship modified to support command and control functions
and two destroyer-type ships. An extreme alternative to this
rather modest naval force is the formidable aircraft carrier
task group, with a nucleus of an attack aircraft carrier, sup-
ported by several surface-to-air missile bearing destroyers/
frigates. A major task force within the Indian Ocean is defined
as an aircraft carrier task group, possibly supported by amphib-
ious and logistic units.
4. Major Operating Naval Base Within the Indian Ocean
The United States Navy is currently utilizing the former
British naval facilities on the island emirate of Bahrain as the
operating base for its Middle East Force. The limited base
facility in Jufair Bay is maintained by 300 shore personnel;
it is restricted in the number and size of ships that it can
accommodate. A major operating base within the Indian Ocean
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must be capable of providing logistic and maintenance support
for major naval combatants, up to and including attack aircraft
carriers. Such an operating base has been proposed for the
British-owned island of Diego Garcia, in the Cbagos Island
group approximately 1,000 miles south of India.
5. Naval Policy
Foreign policy can be divided into its many individual
components under the general categories of military, political,
and economic. Further breakdown of military policy will yield
specific policies of the various military services. Naval
policy is defined as that sub-component of the military component
of foreign policy. As a specific foreign policy is applied in
a specific sector of the international setting, those specific
tactics to be employed by the navy in support of the foreign
policy comprise naval policy.
6. Threat to National Interests
One nation can threaten another by applying a foreign
policy contrary to the national interests of the other. The
threat may take the form of clearly implied and credible foreign
policy objectives which would prevent the threatened nation from
pursuing its national interests. Or, the threat may be only
perceived by the "threatened" nation, basing its perception of
threat on key indicators exhibited by the nation. It is not
sufficient that an actual, well-defined, intentioned threat
54

exist to a nation's national interest in order to provoke a
response from the threatened nation. Rather, a nation will
respond to threats that it perceives to exist that place the
national interests in danger, regardless of the authenticity
of these threats. Therefore, a threat to a country's national
interest by another nation or alliance of nations is defined to
exist if this country perceives that its national interests are
threatened.
7. The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean
Naval units from the Soviet Union first entered the.
Indian Ocean in March, 1968, when a cruiser and two destroyers,
together with logistic support ships, deployed for four months
in the area. The Soviet deployment into the Ocean reflected a
new emphasis for the Soviet Navy. During the Second World War,
and in the immediate period thereafter, the Soviet Navy was
primarily coastal-defense oriented. However, as the Soviet
Union regained its strength following the ravages of war, the
navy began to assume a larger proportion of military emphasis,
and correspondingly, a larger role in the implementation of
national objectives. The first out of area deployment to the
Mediterranean occurred in 1964. Four years later the Soviets
moved their naval presence into the Indian Ocean.
From the initial deployment in 1968, the Soviets made
subsequent visits beginning in November, 1968. The second
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Soviet Naval force into the Ocean was composed of a guided
missile equipped cruiser, a destroyer, and a submarine tender.
Subsequent forces contained more units, and possessed consider-
ably more firepower. "By an October 1970 estimate the Soviet
Naval squadron deployed in the Indian Ocean consisted of approx-
imately 20 vessels: 5 guided missile ships (cruisers or
destroyers), 6 supply ships, 3 submarines, and several intelli-
gence ships, among others."-*' The total "shipmonths" rose from
20 in 1968 to 31 in 1969 and 44 in 1970. 38
The Soviet naval strength in the Ocean has remained
fairly constant in numbers. It is reported that on the average,
one cruiser, several destroyers and submarines, one amphibious
assault ship, three minesweepers, and approximately 17 non-
39
combatant support ships are in the Indian Ocean at any one time.
While the force levels themselves have not appreciably changed
since 1970, the type of units deployed to the Indian Ocean has
changed. Newer and more sophisticated ships, representing the
latest state-of-the-arts in propulsion, fire control, and weapon
Shinsaku Hogen, "The Present State of the Indian Ocean,"
The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic., and Military Importanc e,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 380.
38
A.M. Rendel, London Times
, 16 June 1972, p. 16.
39James Laurie, "The Hardware for Potential Confrontation,"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 27 May 1974, p. 31.
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delivery systems, have replaced the older units. Although
force numbers have not escalated, the combat capability has
been increased.
The Soviet Naval build-up in the Ocean represents more
than a superior force compared with the U.S. Middle East Force.
There are those who believe that the Soviet Union is building
a foundation within the littoral from which to conduct more
extended operations in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union does
not have any permanent support facility in the Ocean, although
anchorages and mooring bouys have been laid near the Seychelles
Islands, Mauritius, and in the Arabian Sea. The Far Eastern
Economic Review reported in May, 1974, that the Soviets "have
expanded their facilities at the Somalia port of Berbera, where
they have a communications station and a restricted area with a
,,41
combined barracks and repair ship facility. The Soviets have
also helped littoral nations in port construction, most notably
in Iraq at Umm Qasr, and in India. Admiral Zumwalt concluded
in March 1974 that the Soviets now possess a support system in
the Indian Ocean "substantially more extensive than that of the
United States, with access to harbors or airstrips in Somalia,
^Hanson W. Baldwin, "Staking Their Claims," New York Times
,
21 March 1972, p. 41.
James Laurie, "The Hardware for Potential Confrontation,"




Iraq and southern Yemen. 1 The Russians also have agreements
with other area countries for port access and facilities. Among
these are Egyptian Red Sea ports, Aden, the Island of Socotra
in the Gulf of Aden, and Mauritius. Hanson Baldwin writing in
the New York Times stated: "The Soviet build-up around the
Indian Ocean littoral is far more important than the small naval
forces they maintain there.'
The pattern of deployment for Soviet Naval units in the
Indian Ocean does not indicate a change in force levels currently
maintained. The Soviet Naval activity in the Ocean centers in
the northwest quadrant, "with Somalia being fostered as the
point d'appui and the port of Berbera serving as the main forward
44base." When and if the Suez Canal opens will undoubtedly
change the pattern of operations within the Ocean, and could
possibly alter the force structure.
/ o
John W. Finney, "Zumwalt backs U.S. Plans for Indian
Ocean Base," New York Times , 21 March 1974, p. 16.
^ 3Hanson W. Baldwin, "Staking Their Claims," New York Times,
21 March 1972, p. 41.
T4ichael MccGuire, ed. , Soviet Naval Developments
,
(New
York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 435.
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B. ASSUMED NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
American national interests within the Indian Ocean and its
littoral states are defined to contain, but not limited to,
these characteristics:
1. Maintenance of free and open surface and air lines of
communications throughout the area of the Indian Ocean.
2. Surveillance of foreign naval activity within the
Indian Ocean.
3. Protection of American citizens throughout the littoral.
4. Access to littoral nations.
The projection of American national interests on a global
scale following World War Two has been subjected to rigid re-
evaluation following the Vietnam conflict. The United States
must develop its national interests in order that it may
successfully interact in the international political sphere as
it exists today, and as it is projected into the near future.
Policies which are formulated to support these national interests
must be evaluated in terms of current national and international
attitudes. The Nixon Doctrine, as stated by former President
Nixon, indicates that in the future the policy of the United
States will be one of a lowered profile which relies on other
nations for a considerable proportion of the resources necessary
for their defense. In light of this doctrine, as well as the
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current reluctance on the part of Congress for new military-
expenditures or foreign commitments, any decision to increase
American efforts in the Indian Ocean area would have to be
thoroughly justified by reasons of national interests.
The foreign policy of the United States in the Indian Ocean
and the littoral states, in support of the national interest, is
most easily effected through diplomatic activity within the
littoral states themselves, strengthened when necessary by the
naval component of the armed forces. The overt act of admitting
ground forces into any of the littoral states during a peacet:.me
environment is totally repugnant to the current domestic attitude
of the American populace as well as the Indian Ocean littoral.
Moreover, Air Force elements would require, land bases from
which to operate, and again would constitute overt intrusion of
the United States armed forces into the littoral. Only at sea
can the United States provide the necessary military strength,
without challenging the sovereignty of the littoral states.
Only by sea can the United States effectively provide material
and combat support within the littoral if these states are
threatened by internal revolutionary forces or third party
support for local guerrilla revolutionary warfare. This prompts
the assumption that American national interests within the
Indian Ocean, as implemented through foreign policy, are most
effectively maintained in peacetime by the United States Navy.
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National interests applied to a specific geographic area
are multi-faceted and complex. This definition of an assumed
national interest will strongly address the Soviet Naval
presence in the Indian Ocean, and the potential implications
of that presence. In order for this thesis to maintain a
modicum of validity over time, a realistic and potential environ-
ment in which the national interests will be structured must be
proposed.
The potential Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean has
received the most attention by area analysts. While it is
recognized that the present level of Soviet naval activity
within the Ocean does not represent a substantial threat, the
trends of worldwide Soviet naval activity seem to indicate an
increasing naval role in Soviet foreign policy. Seymour Weiss,
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department
of State, stated in April, 1974: "As their naval forces and
airlift capabilities have grown, they have demonstrated a com-
plete willingness to project military power into more distant
areas and to use military assistance and shows of force to in-
fluence events where their major interests are at stake."
^5U.S. Department of State, The Department of State
Bulletin
,




Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations,
speaking at a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, in April, 1974, remarked:
'Those interests (of the United States in the Indian Ocean)
relate mainly to the area's key resources, and to the
transportation routes which carry them to the United
States, its friends and its allies. My remarks today
will focus not only on those interests but also on the
need to provide ourselves an adequate capability to
respond to military contingencies affecting our interests
and the significant, increasing ability of the Soviet
Union to threaten those interests."
It is logical to conclude that the aspects of the Soviet
naval activity in the Indian Ocean, whether real or unfounded,
have become a central issue regarding U.S. interests in the
Ocean. The hypothetical character of this assumed national
interest recognizes both the potential threat of the Soviets in
the Indian Ocean, and the high level of credulence given to
this subject by U.S. policy planners.
In order to design a foreign policy to support national
interests, it is necessary to explore national interest by
itself. Although highly inter-related, a country's national
interest can be divided into three broad categories: economic,
political and military.
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Briefings on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate, Hearings, 93rd





The United States has limited direct economic interests
in the Indian Ocean. "Apart from oil investments in the Persian
Gulf, nothing here compares to U.S. trade and investments in
Western Europe, Latin America, or East Asia or to U.S. strategic
interests in Western Europe or Japan. "^' U.S. oil investments
on the Arabian Peninsula are considerable. While the major oil
resource nations of Saudi Arabia and Iran are moving toward
increased nationalization of foreign-owned investments, the
flow of oil to the West is nonetheless tied to vital economic
interests of U.S. industry.
Aside from the Middle East crude oil resources, the
United States does not maintain strong trade relationships
with Indian Ocean littoral nations. "The United States has a
strong positive trade balance with Indian Ocean area countries,
suggesting that they need American products more than the
United States needs their raw materials."^"" Although the
economic interests might not be of a vital nature to the United
Howard Wriggins, "U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean," The
Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 358.
^°Keith Trace, "International Trade and Commercial Relations,"
The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, Inc., 1972), p. 41.
63

States, the political implications of providing raw foodstuffs
and finished goods to the littoral can be of great importance
in the developing nations.
Closely related to the economic aspects of national
interests is the maintenance of, and free access to, the sea
lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean. The lanes of
communication can be segmented into two separate categories:
those sea lanes which involve trade with one or more Indian
Ocean area nations, and those lanes which allow transit through
the Indian Ocean without trade relationships in the littoral
nations
.
Perhaps because of their extensive colonial past in
the Indian Ocean, Great Britain has major economic interests in
the Indian Ocean. "...some 28 percent of its merchandise
exports are consigned to countries bordering the Indian and
West Pacific Oceans. Put rather more forcefully, the U.K.'s
east-of -Suez trade is larger than the rest of Europe's put
together." Western Europe operates more commercial ships in
and through the Indian Ocean than in either the Mediterranean
or the Pacific Oceans. Not only are they active in trade
relationships to obtain raw materials and export finished







is almost totally dependent on the Middle East for oil. Forty-
nine percent of Western Europe's oil imports come from the
Middle East, while 32 percent is imported from North Africa.
Western Europe's economic interests are very dependent on Middle
Eastern oil exports. If these oil exports were interrupted, the
national security of Western Europe would be dangerously
threatened, and European components of NATO forces would be
severely weakened.
"Japan is almost totally dependent on Persian Gulf oil--
in 1969 out of its total imports of 170 million tons, 150 million
came from the Middle East and almost all the rest from Indonesia. "-)1
The importance of the Middle East oil to Japan is even greater
than to Western Europe, and Japan's national security would
likewise be threatened if the oil flow were to be interrupted.
Western Europe and Japan are both important links to the
national security structure of the United States. If one or
both were to be denied access to the Indian Ocean, U.S. national
security interests would be weakened. Whereas the direct
economic involvement of the United States is limited in relation
-^Charles Issawi, "The Politics and Economics of Natural
Resources," The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic, and
Military Importance , ed . by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell






to Western Europe and Japan, and if the Indian Ocean were to
be closed to free and open access to trade, the impact of the
loss of the Indian Ocean trade would be much less severe to the
United States than to either Western Europe or Japan. It is of
prime importance for the United States to maintain free access
to the sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean so that
the strategic balance of power will not be threatened or eroded.
2. Political Interests
The United States is faced with a dilemma in the Indian
Ocean--that of a rising Soviet naval role in support of foreign
policy, and at the same time a continuing sense of nationalism
and non-alignment of the stronger littoral states. If the
Soviet-United States naval buildup takes on the characteristics
of the Richardson escalation model, the littoral states will
not be politically accommodating. However, the United States
can hardly allow the Soviets to be unchecked in the Indian
Ocean.
A more moderate view of U.S. political involvement in the
Indian Ocean can be directed at a post-Vietnam strategy of con-
trolling the sea lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean.
This policy would require that sufficient naval strength be
available to offset threatening naval forces. The United States
must therefore assume a naval posture strong enough to ensure
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freedom of the seas, yet not so strong that the littoral states
would feel threatened.
The Indian Ocean littoral is made up of many developing
Third World nations--acquiring a growing sense of nationalism
and, more recently, an attitude of increasing international
importance. Most of these Third World nations are technologically
lacking, although they possess an abundance of natural resources.
The lack of technological background, coupled with the desir-
ability of the natural resources, results in relationships
between the strong, technologically-developed nations and the
Third World countries. It is a peculiar relationship at best--
the strong and dominating nation and the weak, emerging one.
The relationship can assume a variety of forms, ranging from
informal trade relationships to complete subjugation and
colonial izat ion.
A major power's relationship with Third World nations
must be carefully planned and executed. The great power must
first establish the goals to which the relationship is to be
oriented. The needs or the goals of the Third World nation must
be determined and taken into consideration when planning the type
of relationship. Finally, attitudes of other major-power nations
and key national actors in the geographic area must be determined
if the specific relationship is effected.
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The Nixon Doctrine emphasizes "self-help" and encourages
regional areas to provide for their own mutual assistance.
Marshall R. Singer, in his 1972 work Weak States in a World of
Powers , while not directly stating the Nixon Doctrine, discussed
the relationships between great, powers and Third World nations.
Singer feels that the relationships should be guided by the
concept of interdependence. "Dependent states are in reality
of little advantage to the Power in either peace or war, while
interdependent states are a major advantage at all times.
Dependence tends to breed counterdependence. Interdependence
c o
tends to breed further interdependence." D
The relationships between the Indian Ocean littoral
nations and the United States, when viewed in the context of
national goals and international attitudes, should aspire to
promote interdependence and adherance to the principles of the
Nixon Doctrine.
"The needs of the weaker states are real and there is no
reason why they would or should feel demeaned by making
efforts to fulfill those needs from whichever Powers will
cooperate on the basis of reciprocal mutual interest.
The Powers must make clear precisely what it is they are
doing when they seek to fulfill those needs for specific
weaker countries, and the weaker states must make clear
precisely what they are doing when they seek to fulfill
those needs from as many different Powers as possible'.'"
^Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers







While the military interests of the United States make
up a key part of the economic and political interests, there
are some situations which are uniquely military in nature. The
military interests of the United States are closely related to
the naval activity of the Soviet Union. An examination of the
Soviets' Naval past in the Indian Ocean reveals that their
expansion into the area began modestly in 1968, and has expanded
in terms of deployment duration and force levels. Like the
United States, they have no claim to the littoral of the Indian
Ocean. Their reasons for this forward deployment into the area
are not clearly understood. One source provides the following
explanation: "Recent Soviet actions indicate that the USSR
intends to maintain a credible military presence in the Indian
Ocean and to increase its trade and influence in the area.
Another source speaks of "...national prestige, gaining influ-
ence, showing the flag, filling a power vacuum, gunboat diplo-
macy, and the installation and protection of progressive regimes
from internal and external threats, including threats from the
United States." Whatever the underlying Politburo reasons for
->^B. F. Coye, et al . , "An Evaluation of U.S. Naval Presence
in the Indian Ocean," Naval War College Review
, Oct. 1970 p. 35
S5James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean."
Soviet Naval Developments
, ed. by Michael MccGuire, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973), p. 389.
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deployment of Soviet Naval units into the Indian Ocean, the
American policy-makers must react to their own perceived reasons
for the Soviet deployment, which, in turn, will form the basis
for the perceived threats to American national interests and
resulting foreign policy.
Current American political philosophy tends along worst-
case planning. Through a review of the potential carried by
Soviet Naval units in the Indian Ocean, American planners can
predict possible scenarios for Soviet units as: 1. disruption
of merchant lines of communications, 2. use of Soviet naval units
to provide direct material and combat assistance to revolutionary
movements within the littoral nations, 3. deny the use of the
Indian Ocean to foreign combatants, and 4. control the sea lanes
across the Indian Ocean. These potential scenarios provide the
deep rooted support for the proponents of a strong Indian Ocean
American Naval presence.
The Indian Ocean littoral and its non-alignment and
anti-foreigner philosophy must be carefully evaluated in the
context of the increasing Soviet Naval presence, and what effect
this naval presence has on American national interests. As the
Indian Ocean can be fairly rapidly reinforced from U.S. Pacific
and Atlantic Fleet naval units, the principal question focuses
on the necessity to introduce a new, permanent task force into
the area. By not maintaining a task force in this area, the
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United States would sacrifice the ability to immediately respond
to any quickly developing crisis. Viewing the American national
interest as either economic, political, or military, or some
combination of these, the naval posture that is employed in the
Indian Ocean must be adequate to perform the required mission.
An additional consideration of American policy in the
Indian Ocean includes the use of littoral nations, friendly to
the United States and in agreement with the foreign policy
objectives, to maintain U.S. security objectives in the Ocean.
This approach is not overly appealing in that most littoral
states do not totally agree with the United States national
interests, and therefore may balk at some point in supporting
U.S. interests. Furthermore, it would be necessary for the
U.S. -allied littoral nations to be clearly identified as such
in order that they might serve as a deterrent to actions by
others against our interests. Not only would this increase
the credibility of a response to activities contrary to U.S.
interests, but also it would promote the understanding along
the littoral of the American national interests. At the same
time, however, overt political relationships which in effect
would give the United States a proxy-presence in the Indian
Ocean would run contrary to the prevailing littoral attitude,
of nonalignment. Therefore, it will be assumed for the purpose
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of a clear presentation of national interests that some form of
U.S. presence or complete absence will be required.
Aside from the potential Soviet Naval threat in the
Indian Ocean, there exists the military involvement by the
United States within littoral nations. The United States has
in the past supported newly independent states in the area.
"The United States has played an active diplomatic role
in the area since World War II, exercising such varied
tools of diplomacy as development assistance, military
assistance, political mediation, and U.S. initiatives in
an effort to discourage conflict and contain it when it
occurs. Obviously one of the diplomatic levers available
to us is the deterrent effect of a military presence. We
believe that the modest presence we have traditionally
maintained in the Persian Gulf, supplemented as necessary
by more frequent deployments of additional ships, serves
that purpose. "56
United States military interests must include the possi-
bility of military activity within the littoral. The activity
can take several forms, including support for a littoral nation
threatened by an external pressure, or a direct U.S. military
confrontation with a beligerent littoral nation itself.
4. Reconnaissance Network
"In a major test of America's post-Vietnam foreign policy,
the United States Navy has secretly organized an informal alliance.
Seymour Weiss, "U.S. Interests and Activities in the
Indian Ocean," U.S. Department of State, The Department of State
Bulletin
,




of the most powerful states in the Indian Ocean area. Iran,
South Africa, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and other countries are
now linked in a military reconnaissance network which spans
the area from the Straits of Malacca in the east to the Cape
of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa."-'' The concept of
the reconnaissance network is not idealistic. The entrances
to the Indian Ocean have been limited by geography. Only two
entrances are of any size: south of the. Cape of Good Hope and
south of Australia. More narrow routes include the Indonesian
Straits, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz of the Persian
Gulf. The United States is fairly well allied with the major
countries dominating these passages, and can effectively monitor
surface ship movements into the Indian Ocean. Supplemented by
reconnaissance aircraft from area air bases and overhead
reconnaissance satellites, the United States can monitor foreign-
navy surface ship movements in the Indian Ocean, while maintain-
ing the low-key naval posture that is acceptable to the littoral
of the Indian Ocean.
This informally aligned reconnaissance, network does not
represent a permanent component of the U.S. Indian Ocean military
policy. Political relationships within some of the participating
Tom Engelhardt, "A Calculated Gamble for Naval Power,"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 27 May 1974, p. 30.
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nations could change; chinks in the reconnaissance chain could
develop. Tom Engelhardt, writing in the Far Eastern Economic
Review , feels that a serious weakness with this network is the
very nature of the governments of these countries. "From
South Africa and Iran to Indonesia and Thailand, U.S. -backed
regimes preside over volatile, potentially discontented popula-
tions. "-* Another drawback to the network is a lack of sub-
surface surveillance. Moreover, overhead satellite reconnais-
sance and aircraft reconnaissance patrols are subjected to the
weather. At best the reconnaissance network is of limited
accuracy and coverage in regard to ocean traffic within the
Indian Ocean. However, the ability of this network to monitor
foreign navy surface activity in the Indian Ocean is not
completely diminished. The United States Navy could quickly
augment its present Indian Ocean forces if a Soviet buildup is
anticipated or effected. Furthermore, if political conditions
within the area littoral threaten that which the United States
perceives as its national i.nterests, U.S. Naval units could
respond from the Sixth or Seventh Fleets,
5. Summation of Assumed National Interests
Economically and militarily, the Soviet Union does not






perceptions of national security. Any overt, aggressive action
by the Soviets would evoke a determined U.S. response, and the
United States Navy can more rapidly bring to bear overwhelming
sea and air superiority.
Only in the realm of Third World nations does the Soviet
Fleet-in-being contest the ideals and ideology of the Western
world as perceived by the United States. The Soviet Naval
presence, their willingness to provide support, and their
present naval force level in the Indian Ocean are clear advan-
tages that they have over the absence of a permanent U.S. naval
task force. Nevertheless, the attitudes of the Nixon Doctrine,
coupled with the post-Vietnam political position of the American
government, reduces the impact that these Third World nations
exert on U.S. national interests.
An article appearing in the October, 1970 issue of the
Naval War College Review concluded a survey of the U.S. naval
presence in the Indian Ocean: "in the final analysis U.S.
interests would be served best were the United States to hold
the level of its involvement in the Indian Ocean area to a
low-profile, while assisting the littoral countries in protecting
their own interests. 1 Howard Wriggins writes: "...it is
-^B. F. Coye, et al. , "An Evaluation of U.S. Naval Presence




premature to decide now that a major buildup of U.S. forces in
the Indian Ocean is necessary. Indeed, such a decision might
precipitate that very naval competition that neither super-
power may desire. M "u
60TT . .wriggins, o£. cit .
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IV. THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze a specific foreign
policy in support of assumed American national interests in the
Indian Ocean. The foreign policy under study directly involves
the United States Navy, so that the history of the United States
Navy in the Indian Ocean, beginning in the Second World War and
continuing up to projected future operations in the Ocean, will
be discussed. It is important to note that past, present and
future U.S. naval operations in the Indian Ocean do not repre-
sent a force structure designed to implement the hypothetical
foreign policy nor the assumed national interests of this
paper. Rather, a review of the United States Navy in the
Indian Ocean will present a realistic reference point from
which to structure the hypothetical foreign and naval policies.
The naval involvement in specific geographical locations is
the tool by which foreign policy objectives are pursued or
realized. In a more limited sense the naval involvement itself
is directed toward specific objectives. Some knowledge of
these objectives is important in order to understand the level
of naval activity in the area. A brief account of stated naval
objectives in the Indian Ocean will be summarized. While
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disagreements exist as to what these objectives ought to be,
the current objectives guiding the United States naval policy
in the Ocean will be presented.
In the discussion of the United States Navy in a specific
geographical location such as the Indian Ocean, one must be
careful to maintain contact with the worldwide military and
political environments as well. The size and force composition
of the world's navies following the Second World War, together
with international interactions between various nations, have
significant influence on events in the specific geographical
area. This was no more clearly illustrated than during the
Vietnam-United States conflict, where the United States used
massive naval forces in Indochina relative to other worldwide
operating areas.
A. THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: PAST
1. Post World War II
The United States Navy following World War Two was
unchallenged in superiority. Moreover, of those navies on the
side of the Allies, no other navy could approach the United
States Navy relative to force levels, technological advances,
and successful combat experience. However, the Indian Ocean
held a low priority in United States foreign policy, partly
because the British remained dominant in the Ocean, and partly
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because the United States held limited national interests in
this then-remote area. Furthermore, American attention follow-
ing the War was directed at post-war recovery and rehabilitation,
rather than continued worldwide deployments and operations.
American Naval activity in the Indian Ocean during World
War II was primarily based in the Persian Gulf. "Between 1941
and 1945 almost one-fourth of U.S. aid cargoes to the U.S.S.R.
were shipped via the Gulf.""^ A separate Persian Gulf Command
was established in 1943. Following the war this force was
greatly reduced, and it consisted of one seaplane tender and
two destroyers. In 1949 the force was re-named the Middle East
Force. The Center for Naval Analysis said of this Force:
"Throughout the post-war period the major dimensions of
MidEastFor have remained nearly constant: (a) its assigned
forces: one seaplane tender, two destroyers, one command
aircraft; (b) its area of responsibility: from the
African coast to the Burma border, from the Equator to
Iran; and (c) its primary mission: 'showing the flag in
remote areas and to provide assurance to all countries
in the Middle East Force area of our friendship and
readiness to help them. '"62
The Middle East Force has maintained an unobtrusive
presence in the Ocean during the period following the war. This
is generally in keeping with the low priority that the Indian
"^Barry M. Blechman and Anne M. Kelly, The Soviet Presence
in the Indian Ocean: Implications for U.S. Naval Planning
,
Center for Naval Analysis, Institute of Naval Studies, Study 36,





Ocean occupied in United States foreign policy. "U.S. interests
in the Indian Ocean are generally regarded as minimal, but
attention must here be drawn again to the heavy dependence of
U.S. allies in Europe on Indian Ocean trade and raw materials. D:>
"The U.S. government appears to have accepted the sensible view
that its interests are served by a virtual universal abstention
from a military presence in the Indian Ocean. ""^
The low-key United States effort was supported by the
British naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and an absence of
rival navies. However, at the same time that the British were
reducing their naval forces east of Suez up to 1971, the Soviet
Union began to buildup a permanently deployed force commencing
in 1968. Although American national interests were not immedi-
ately re-focused in this area, it is clear that the political
and military environment in which they would interact had
changed, and a military imbalance began to weigh in favor of
the Soviets.
During the time of the 1968 Soviet entry into the
Indian Ocean, the United States Navy was heavily committed in
63Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, eds
.
, The Indian
Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance
,
(New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 334.
^Howard Wriggins, "U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean,"
The Indian Ocean : Its Political, Economic and M i litary Importance
,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), p. 362.
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Vietnam. The Soviet Naval force in the Indian Ocean was not
engaged in overtly hostile operations; U.S. national interests
did not seem to be threatened. This enabled the United States
to concentrate naval forces in the Western Pacific while still
maintaining the low priority in the Indian Ocean. The Soviets
continued to increase the deployed Indian Ocean force size
throughout the Vietnam conflict. Only after United States Naval
requirements in Vietnam were reduced could the United States re-
structure its naval priorities and area deployments.
2. Post-Vietnam
Owing to the complexities of the Vietnam war and the
ongoing nature of the conflict, it is difficult to establish
a specific time-frame which delineates this era. A new element
in American Indian Ocean naval policy was initiated, however,
during the December, 1971, Indo-Pakistan war. The United States
introduced a carrier task force and an amphibious ready group
into the Bay of Bengal in December 1971. This significant
departure from a low-key naval presence will serve as a logical
division for this discussion.
Prior to December, 1971, there have been other occasions
when naval units briefly operated in the Indian Ocean. "There
have been occasional pass-throughs of United States naval ships
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and periodic shore visits.' However, these visits did not
represent a change in the low-key approach to naval policy in
the Ocean.
The United States naval response to the Indo-Pakistan
War represented a new look for United States Naval policy in
the Indian Ocean. Whereas the Soviet Naval force in the Ocean
is of moderate combat strength, the United States Task Force,
led by USS ENTERPRISE, was made up of major naval combatants,
including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, an amphibious
assault carrier, a multi-product logistical support ship, and
missile-equipped escort units.
This new- look policy was not initiated without advance
notice. On 29 September 1971 Vice Admiral Maurice F. Weisner,
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, said that the United States
Seventh Fleet "would begin sending more ships into the Indian
Ocean in response to a Soviet build-up there.' Admiral
Weisner said that these ships would be organized as patrols
rather than as permanent forces assigned to the Indian Ocean.
Following the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan,
the United States Navy detailed this naval task force to the Bay





30 September 1971, p. 9.
s Due in Indian Ocean," New York T imes
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of Bengal. "Its apparent mission was to stand by in case
Americans had to be evacuated from either East or West Pakistan,
to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was not the only big power
with force in the area and perhaps to discourage India from any
attempt to dismember West Pakistan."
During this same time period the organizational structures
of Navy command channels were rearranged, in order that the
Seventh Fleet could have its "official area of responsibility
extended to encompass the whole Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area,
previously split with the Atlantic Command." The United
States task force conducted routine operations in the Bay of
Bengal, remaining free from any involvement in the Indo-Pakistan
war.
The significance of the task force penetration into the
Indian Ocean is far more than merely a naval reaction to the
Indo-Pakistan war. Prior to the outbreak of war, there were
indications that the United States was preparing to conduct
periodic patrols using Seventh Fleet units in response to the
Soviet Naval presence. The war provided an excellent pretext
for introducing the carrier task force into the Ocean in order
William Beecher, "U.S. Move in Indian Ocean is Linked to
Commitments," New York Times
, 8 January 1972, p. 10.
68Tom Engelhardt, "A Calculated Gamble for Naval Power,"
Far Eastern Economic Review , 27 May 1974, p. 33.
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to safeguard American lives. However, "the ENTERPRISE stayed
in the Indian Ocean for more than three weeks after the cease-
fire between India and Pakistan," Michael Kallory reports,
"and the Pentagon spokesmen said one reason for its continued
maneuvers was the navy's 'desire to gain operating experience
in that area. Mlby While official American foreign policy in
the Ocean continued to promote a low-keyed presence, the
ENTERPRISE task force signaled a change in policy.
John W. Finney reported on 7 January 1972 in the New
York Times : "The Defense department said today that the Navy
would conduct periodic operations in the Indian Ocean to help
establish an American presence in a new area of strategic
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union." It
appears that the continuing Vietnam conflict notwithstanding,
the United States began to respond to the growing Soviet Naval
presence in the Ocean, and that this new naval policy would be
one which would encounter the least resistance of the Indian
Ocean littoral. Although the littoral denounces any great
power naval presence in the Ocean, an occasional task force
patrol is much less objectionable than a permanently deployed
69Michael T. Mallory, "New Act in an Old Game," Far Eastern
Economic Review , 19 February 1972, p. 21.
John W. Finney, "Indian Ocean Role is Planned by U.S.,"
New York Times , 7 January 1972, p. 1.
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naval task force or a permanent United States base within the
Indian Ocean.
It appears that the naval policy in the Indian Ocean
during the waning years of United States Naval involvement in
Vietnam would more actively address the Soviet Naval presence,
but short of introducing a permanent task force here in addition
to the Middle East Force. This is most easily and effectively
accomplished by the occasional aircraft carrier task force
patrols into the Indian Ocean.
William Beecher wrote in the 8 January 1972 New York
Times : "Pentagon officials stressed today that plans to send
United States warships more frequently into the Indian Ocean
were announced several years ago but that their implementation
had been deferred because of the Vietnam war.
"Such deployments, the Pentagon officials argued, are
consonant with the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on having allies
supply their own ground forces while the United States maintains
7 *)powerful air and naval forces in Asia."'
The ENTERPRISE-led task force in the Indian Ocean in
December 1971 might signal, a new phase in American naval policy
in the Ocean. Not only were periodic naval visits into the
-7 1
William Beecher, "U.S. Move in Indian Ocean is Linked to




Indian Ocean projected by the Defense Department prior to the
Indo-Pakistan war, but also they were supported during and
after the war. The post-Vietnam policy would include the
continuation of the Middle East Force at Bahrain and a renewed
emphasis on periodic, task force operations in the Indian Ocean.
At the time of the Indo-Pakistan war, the United States
Navy obtained a semi-permanent naval station on the island of
Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. The United States assumed the
rights that they had enjoyed when it was under British control.
Department of Defense officials "emphasized that the agreement
with Bahrain merely extended arrangements for use of the base
that the United States had with Britain before she withdrew
from the Persian Gulf and that it did not contain or imply
any political or military commitments to Bahrain or any other
nation in the area."'-* The Middle East Force would continue to
be based at the Jufair Bay naval complex on Bahrain.
B. THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: PRESENT
The current United States naval policy has maintained the
basic post-Vietnam approach in the Indian Ocean, with the
Middle East Force stationed at Bahrain at a constant force
level of three units, and periodic deployments of Seventh Fleet
^^Michael T. Mallory, "New Act in an Old Game," Far Ea s tern
Economic Review
, 19 February 1972, p. 21.
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units into the area. Nonetheless, recent indicators have
pointed toward a more active naval role in the Indian Ocean,




In 1966 Britain and the United States signed an
agreement for "United States military use of Diego Garcia for
the construction, at U.S. expense, of joint facilities consist-
ing of 'communications and minimum necessary support facilities
including an airstrip.'"'
In the spring of 1973 the United States Navy opened
a communications station on Diego Garcia in the British owned
Chagos Archipelago to help control the future movements of
ships and aircraft through the Indian Ocean area. The communi-
cations station includes a radio station manned by approximately
300 Navy personnel, an 8,000-foot runway and a small harbor
being dredged in the island's lagoon.
Electro-magnetic communications have been extremely
poor in the western Indian Ocean. A communications facility at
Diego Garcia would greatly enhance the command and control
James Laurie, "Diego Garcia: Expansion Plans," Far Easter:
Economic Review
, 27 May 1974, p. 32.
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capability of U.S. Naval units operating in the Indian Ocean.
However, this communications station represented a new, great
power, land-based presence in the Indian Ocean. "But in
keeping with the 'low-key' guideline laid down by the Defense
Department for publicity about the Diego Garcia facility, no
public announcement was made.'
The lack of publicity given to Diego Garcia has
two underlying reasons. First, the littoral attitude toward
great power presence in the Indian Ocean would not easily
accept the United States Naval involvement on the island. "In
view of these nations' concern that the Indian Ocean not be
turned into a new region of strategic competition between the
major powers, the Defense Department has emphasized that the
Diego Garcia base would be a 'modest' communications facility,
not portending a United States Navy build-up in the Ocean. "'^
Secondly, the United States did not want to signal to the Soviet
Union the beginning of a naval escalation between the two super-
powers.
It is questionable that the Diego Garcia communica-
tions facility represents a significant departure from the low-key
7 SJohn W. Finney, "U.S. Opens Small Post in Indian Ocean,"
New York Times




U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. United States Naval policy
during this time included periodic patrols from the Seventh
Fleet; the communications station here would enhance operational
control of the visiting units. More importantly, the facility
did not threaten Soviet Naval units in the Indian Ocean,
b. An Expanded Operating Facility
The ceasefire following the October, 1973, Arab-
Israeli war included provisions for the re-opening of the Suez
Canal. "The assumption of defense officials is that the Soviet
Union will take advantage of a reopened canal to increase its
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The defense department
is therefore looking ahead to establishing a counter-balancing
naval force in an area that controls the sea lanes to Middle
East Oil." 77
It was reported in the New York Times on 22 January
1974 that: "Pentagon officials said today that preliminary
discussions had already been held with the British Government
about expanding the small naval station on the island so that
78it could support naval operations in the Indian Ocean."
Prior to this new proposal for United States naval
involvement in the Indian Ocean, the American Naval policy had
''"U.S. Weighs Establishing Indian Ocean Naval Base," New




adhered to the general structure of a low-keyed presence and
was in consonance with the broad guidelines of the Nixon
Doctrine. Furthermore, this naval policy appeared to meet
American security objectives and national interests in the
Indian Ocean. The projection of a U.S. base in the Indian
Ocean would greatly alter the existing political and military
relationships between the United States and the littoral, and
between the United States and the Soviet Union. This represents
a substantial reorientation of foreign policy in the Ocean.
The 22 January New York Times article was supported
by a 5 February 1974 announcement in the Lond onJTime s by British
Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Julian Amery, that a
U.S. base was to be set up on Diego Garcia. Mr. Amery cited
the Soviet naval presence as a major factor in the operating
base. "The British Government had long felt that it was desir-
able in the general Western interest to balance increased Soviet
,79
activities in the Indian Ocean area.
The proposed installation of Diego Garcia would be
able to accommodate aircraft carriers as well as airplanes of
the KC-135/Boeing 707 size. "Upgrading the base facilities
involves increased fuel storage capacity, deepening the lagoon
79"A U.S. Base in Indian Ocean to be Set Up on British Isle,"
New York Time s, 6 February 1974, p. 4.
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to provide anchorages for larger vessels, and improving the
80
communications network."
In order to mitigate the effect that the proposed
base would have on the Indian Ocean littoral nations and the
Soviet Union, "Defense and State Department officials have
emphasized that even with the expansion, the base would be a
modest supply installation designed to support intermittent
naval operations in the Indian Ocean." That this veiled
attempt to reduce the strategic impact of the Diego Garcia
base failed is given by Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh:
"The Indian Government 'cannot escape the conclusion' that
United States plans to expand naval and air facilities on Diego
Garcia were 'connected with a more long-term presence of United
States Naval forces in the area. M,°^
The United States Senate, acting on the 1975 Military
Construction Authorization bill, considered the request for 29
million dollars to improve the Diego Garcia facility. The
Senate, while recognizing the advantages that such an operating
base would give to the Navy, also recognized the foreign policy
80James Laurie, "Diego Garcia: Expansion Plans," Far Ea s tern
Economic Review , 27 May 1974, p. 32.
O "I
John W. Finney, "R.ole of Indian Ocean Base is Discussed,"
New York Times , 13 March 1974, p. 3.
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impact of the installation. The Senate Armed Services committee
approved only half of the funds requested. "It said the 14.8
million was approved 'as a first increment in the Navy's require-
ments,' and noted that the committee had included a section in
the bill precluding the spending of the funds until the President
certifies that the construction is essential to the national
interests." 83
Although funds have not presently been authorized
for the completion of the entire Diego Garcia improvement project
as planned by the Navy, it has nevertheless served notice to the
international community that the United States plans to raise
its level of naval involvement in the Indian Ocean. Diego
Garcia remains as a communications station and a base for naval
reconnaissance aircraft, but it is viewed by the international
community as a potential U.S. operating base.
2. United States Naval Units in the Indian Ocean
a. Middle East Force
The Middle East Force has continued to operate from
the former British base on the island of Bahrain in the Persian
Gulf. The. force has continued to remain at a constant force
level of three ships. In the fall of 1972 the aging flagship
o oJAlan Jarvis , "Senate OK's Funds for Diego Garcia," Navy
Times
, 2 October 1974, p. 19.
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was replaced by a newly converted amphibious landing ship (LPD)
,
providing increased communications capabilities and greater
space for supportive elements. The other two naval units are
destroyers, rotated from the Atlantic Fleet for a tour in the
Indian Ocean.
Owing to the non-combatant role of the flagship,
and the limited offensive capabilities of the destroyers, the
Middle East Force does not project a major naval force commit-
ment in the Ocean. It primarily serves to show the flag
throughout the littoral, as well as to assert the United States
attitude that the Indian Ocean is not a closed sea.
The continuation of the American naval facility on
Bahrain is not assured. "Last October 21 (1973) during the
Arab-Israeli war, Bahrain's ruler Emir Issa Bin Sulman Al-Khalifa
Q A
ordered the United States MidEastFor out within one year.'
Early in October, 1974, however, it was reported that Bahrain
reversed its decision to expel the Navy. "Bahrain's high regard
for the symbolic value of its ties to the United States, the
American peace effort in the Middle East and Saudi Arabian support
for an American military presence in the Persian Gulf are evi-
dently the chief factors in the Bahraini decision.""-*
O A
° U.S. Navy to Stay in Bahrain," Monterey Peninsula Herald
,
4 October 1974, p. 16.
° 5
"Navy Allowed to Stay Despite Time Limit," Monterey
Peninsula Herald
,
21 October 1974, p. 18.
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Bahrain's close ties with the major oil-producing
Arab nations places the future of the naval base in Jufair Bay
in considerable doubt.
b. Periodic Visits to the Indian Ocean
Subsequent to the ENTERPRISE Task Force into the
Indian Ocean of November, 1971, United States Seventh Fleet
units have been occasionally deployed in that area. During the
crisis of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States
dispatched an aircraft carrier task force, led by the aircraft
carrier HANCOCK, into the Indian Ocean. This U.S. Naval
reaction to a Middle East conflict has added another dimension
to the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. The volitility
of the Arab-Israeli question, coupled with the Western world's
dependence on Arab-held crude oil, places great significance
on this area. That a naval reaction to the 1973 hostilities
was made in the Indian Ocean ushers in a two-ocean front for
the entire Middle Eastern area. As a matter of U.S. Naval
policy, however, most naval deployments to the area provide the
navy with operating experience in the Ocean, and are not a
reaction to a crisis. Short of stationing a permanent naval
task force in the Ocean, this current U.S. Naval policy will
continue the periodic visits.
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C. UNITED STATES NAVAL OBJECTIVES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
The United States Naval objectives for the 1970' s in the
Indian Ocean are not clearly defined. It is certain, however,
that one major aspect of American foreign policy in the Ocean
is in response to the Soviet Naval presence in the area. There
is a recurrent theme in virtually all the literature and
periodicals on this subject: a United States response to the
Soviet Naval presence in the Indian Ocean. United States
interests here are not limited to the Soviet Naval presence.
The economic and political interests among the littoral nations
must not be neglected. Economic interests are of significant
importance. A great many Western-allied nations are vitally
dependent upon the Indian Ocean, both as a trade base with
littoral nations, and as an ocean highway to transport necessary
raw materials and finished products. It is unlikely that any
littoral nation has a navy strong enough to threaten the
economic transactions in the Ocean. Rather, the chief potential
threat to economic activity in the area is the Soviet Union's
Naval forces. Therefore, the United States Naval objectives in
the Indian Ocean, while not slighting the economic and political
interests, will be examined with respect to the Soviet Naval
presence.
Beyond the question of a United States Naval response to
the Soviet Naval presence in the Ocean are the ramifications
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of one power's response to the activities of the other. Any
change in the status quo by one side would be subject to a
possible response from the other. The consequences of a naval
arms race in the area by the two great powers must be understood
to properly view the various naval objectives.
1. Soviet Naval Threat in the Indian Ocean
An assessment of the Soviet Naval threat in the Indian
Ocean requires some insight into the intentions of Soviet
leaders. Whereas these intentions cannot be directly examined,
one can use empirical data to establish a perception of what
these intentions might be. In the case of the Soviet Union,
the objectives stated by the Soviet leaders are analyzed in
terms of the capability to achieve those objectives. Where
the capability is far stronger than the objectives might call
for, one might interpret an objective based upon the capability
rather than the stated objective. This latter phenomena is
sometimes called worst-case planning.
Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zurnwalt,
is a strong supporter of an American response to the Soviet Naval
presence in the Ocean. Admiral Zurnwalt felt that "Soviet
tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian Ocean.""
86
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The naval capabilities of the deployed Soviet force in
the Indian Ocean, coupled with the littoral support potential,
provide the Soviets with a stronger naval force than that of
the United States. This Soviet naval force must be analyzed
in terms of threat, however. Whereas American military planners
believe that the threat is credible and real, others recognize
a more moderate threat.
The growth of the Soviet Naval presence in the Indian
Ocean is a part of a worldwide expansion in deployments and
missions of the Soviet Navy. The force that is now being main-
tained in the Ocean does not have the capability to disrupt sea
lanes of communications, or threaten littoral nations. Rather;,
it emphasizes the political influence and presence roles of
the Soviet Union within the Ocean. Nonetheless, the current
worldwide posture of the Soviet Navy, as opposed to the early
1960's when the Soviets still promoted a coastal-defense oriented
force, is indicative of the changing emphasis for the navy.
Whether or not a viable naval threat by the Soviet Union
actually exists in the Indian Ocean is of much less importance
than what American policy planners perceive the extent of the
threat to be. The Soviet Navy is in the Indian Ocean. The
naval units do possess a credible threat capability. Soviet
Union and Indian Ocean regional analysts must determine inten-
tions, but since a credible capability exists, the intentions
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are attributed to the military capabilities and potential of
the naval units. American policy planners, therefore, must
address the threat capability possessed by Soviet Naval units
in the Indian Ocean, rather than relying on stated Soviet
objectives.
2. United States-Soviet Naval Escalation
A military arms build-up by two great powers in the
Indian Ocean is feared by littoral nations, and forms the basis
for their objection to great power navies in the Ocean. This
has been recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union,
but it appears neither is willing to offer major concessions to
the other. The London Times reported in February, 1972, that:
"The United States has approached the Soviet Union about the
possibility of an agreement to restrain the American and
Russian military presence in the Indian Ocean. °'
Admiral Zumwalt, when questioned about the possibility
of a naval race in the Indian Ocean if the United States estab-
lished a base at Diego Garcia, reported that: "Expansion of
the Diego Garcia facility would not set off a naval race in
the Indian Ocean since the Soviet Union was already 'on the
87
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move 1 in the region and expanding ij:s naval presence." It is
apparent that the former Chief of Naval Operations believed
that the Soviets were expanding their naval capabilities in
the area independent of United States naval activities. An
opposing viewpoint was presented by the United Nations in a
report on big-power activities in the Indian Ocean. "The plans
to convert Britain's island of Diego Garcia into a United States
naval base were almost certain to prompt the Soviet Union to
seek similar facilities and so spur another arms race."""
The report continued, "The instabilities inherent in
the Indian Ocean area will not easily permit a mutual balance
to be maintained successfully by the two great powers over a
period of time. And the chances of great-power rivalry inter-
on
acting with local conflicts, and then escalating, are high.
There exists a potential for Soviet-United States naval
escalation as long as both nations maintain a naval force of
any size in the Indian Ocean. The arms race can be mitigated
by one side unilaterally restraining its force levels independent
of the opposite side, or by mutual and realistic agreement by
88John W. Finney, "Zumwalt Backs U.S. Plans for Indian
Ocean Base," New York Times , 21 March 1974, p. 16.
89Kathleen Teltsch, "U.N. Study Draws Broad Protest," New
York Times , 25 May 1974, p. 7.




both sides to restrict naval build-ups. Of these two options,
the former undermines military preparedness in the area, while
the latter presumes a relationship of trust and similarity of
purpose. Although an arms race has not yet developed in the
Indian Ocean, current trends in both United States and Soviet
Union Naval policies in the Indian Ocean can lead to a great
power naval escalation, and the potential for armed conflict
between the great powers.
D. THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: THE FUTURE
Future American foreign policy in the Indian Ocean derives
its content from the American perception of its national inter-
ests. Specifically, the United States perception of national
interests must address not only the Soviet Naval presence in
the Ocean, but also the relations between the United States and
the littoral nations. The options for United States Naval
policy range from a complete withdrawal of U.S. Naval units on
one end, to a permanent carrier task group stationed in the
Ocean on the other. While it would be difficult to interpret
American national interests in the long term, the near-future
interests can be extrapolated from existing trends.
In the near- future one can project no major departure from
present naval policy in the Indian Ocean. The Middle East Force
is expected to contimie its operations on Bahrain, unless a
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situation similar to that of the Arab sentiment during the
1973 Arab-Israeli war forces Bahrain to expel U.S. naval forces.
The periodic visits of U.S. Naval units into the Ocean will
also probably continue at their present level. Moreover, the
projected naval base on Diego Garcia could be used as either
a base from which a carrier task force might be permanently-
stationed, or as an outpost support facility where visiting
naval ships could perform limited maintenance and receive
limited logistical support.
At present, the future of the United States Naval involve-
ment in Diego Garcia is unknown. The plans to convert Diego
Garcia into an operating base have met with considerable
opposition, both from within this country and outside. The
proposed naval base would provide otherwise non-existent land-
based logistic and support facilities. The argument is undis-
puted that the Diego Garcia base would be invaluable to a task
force operating in the Indian Ocean. However, the disadvantages
weigh heavily. The littoral is firmly opposed to the base.
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Indonesia have warned that
it is a bad idea. Former ambassador to India, Chester Bowles,
writes: "If we intend to frighten the Russians, or others out
of the Indian Ocean it is a laughable gesture. If we intend to
demonstrate our continued interest in Asia by setting up shop
on Asian 'turf we should think hard about our past experience
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in such Asian ventures.' United States policy planners will
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the Diego Garcia
operating base, and ensure that this specific foreign policy is
consistent with United States national interests in the Indian
Ocean.
E. THE KRA CANAL AND THE SEVENTH FLEET
United States Seventh Fleet naval units are being used by
the Navy to make periodic visits in the Indian Ocean. Aircraft
carrier task groups have recently operated in the Persian Gulf
as well as throughout the Ocean. The Malacca Straits are
being used as the access route through the Indonesia-Malay
Barrier. A canal through the Isthmus of Kra with free access
granted to U.S. combatant and logistic units would reduce
transit distances and facilitate logistic support to units
operating in the Indian Ocean.
1. Transit Distances
The approximate distance from Manila, Philippine
Islands, to Calcutta, India, through the Malacca Straits is
2,979 nautical miles. Transit distance through the Kra Canal
is approximately 700 nautical miles less. Comparable reduction
in transit distances from locations other than Manila, such as
"Chester Bowles, "A Considerable Speck," New York Times
,
13 May 1974, p. 31.
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Japan or Guam, can be expected. Similarly, the savings in
distance applies to other locations within the Indian Ocean.
Whereas the reduction in transit distance was signifi-
cant in the time of sailing ships or early steam-powered
vessels, the Navy of today is capable of sustained transit
speeds of twenty knots. Translated into time-savings, approxi-
mately thirty-five hours could be eliminated by use of the Kra
Canal, provided no excess trans -canal time is encountered in
the canal transit.
For access to the Indian Ocean through the Barrier by
Seventh Fleet units for routine operations, a transit time
reduction of thirty-five hours is insignificant. However, if
a crisis situation were to quickly develop, this time savings
could acquire increasing importance. The time and distance
saved by using the proposed Kra Canal could be of some benefit
to Seventh Fleet units only if an immediate response to events
in the Indian Ocean is imperative for the security of U.S.
national interests.
An additional consideration of the Kra Canal is necessary
if the Indonesia-Malaysia claim to territorial waters of the
Malacca Straits is realized and passage is restricted for foreign
warships. In this case, units traveling from the Seventh Fleet
to the Indian Ocean by way of the Timor Sea north of Australia
would have to travel an additional three thousand miles. This
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prohibitively time-consuming route would be unacceptable if a
rapid response were required of Seventh Fleet units to the
Indian Ocean.
In the event that all passages through the Barrier were
blocked through hostile action, the route north of Australia
would be the only alternative for Seventh Fleet units to deploy
into the Indian Ocean. In this case, a crisis situation in the
Ocean requiring U.S. Naval forces would by default be the
responsibility of the Middle East Force.
2. Logistical Support
A major problem for a task force operating in the Indian
Ocean is the vital requirement for logistic support. Until
every naval ship is operating on nuclear powe?:, the primary
logistic requirement will be petroleum, oil and lubricants.
Fuel for ship and aircraft propulsion is consumed in huge quan-
tities during aircraft launch-recovery operations arid anti-
submarine patrols. To a lesser extent repair-parts support
and consumable-provisions replenishment is necessary for longer-
term, continuous operations in an area. It is primarily for
these reasons, together with the necessity to conduct required
ship maintenance, that the centrally located operating base at
Diego Garcia is being sought.
Without any logistic support from within the Indian
Ocean littoral, necessary logistic products would have to be
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provided by the Pacific Fleet through the Indonesia-Malay
Barrier, or by the Atlantic Fleet through Suez, if and when
opened. Support from the east is preferable owing to its
superior geographic, proximity to the Indian Ocean.
In past aircraft carrier task force operations in the
Indian Ocean, multi-product logistic support ships occasionally
would accompany the task force. This was especially evident
when the ENTERPRISE task force responded to the Indo-Pakistan
war in December, 1971, and in October, 1973, when the HANCOCK
task force reacted to the Arab-Israeli war.
United States naval underway replenishment units have
dramatically improved since the Second World War. Older units
dedicated to carrying a single product, such as fuel oil and
lubricants, or ammunition, or dry and perishable provisions,
have been replaced by twenty-knot ships with the capability of
carrying a variety of logistic products. These new replenish-
ment ships are capable of supporting an aircraft carrier task
force for an extended period, the length depending upon the
nature of the operations being conducted and the units involved.
Additional replenishment ships , if required by the
operating force in the Indian Ocean, could save approximately
thirty-five hours in transit time between Subic Bay and the
Indian Ocean if they were to use the Kra Canal. During peace-
time operations in the Indian Ocean this reduction in transit
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time is not of great importance. However, if the transit routes
through the Barrier were closed to U.S. Naval units, the logistic
ships would be forced to reach the Indian Ocean by way of
northern Australia. In order to adequately re-supply a task
force in the Ocean, on an extended basis, a large number of
support ships would be involved so that the proper interval of
re-supply could be maintained despite the long transit distance.
In a time of crisis in the Indian Ocean, where U.S.
naval units would have to conduct extended naval operations in
the area, the Kra Canal could give the United States a logistic,
advantage. Assuming that a multi-product support ship would
accompany the task force into the ocean, as in the case of the
Indo-Pakistan and Arab-Israeli wars, the continuing logistic
support problem is allowed extra time to become organized.
The number of additional logistic support ships that would be
required would depend upon the round- trip transit t5.me for
these units from Subic Bay to the task force operating area,
and the logistic requirements of the force. A savi.ngs of
thirty-five hours in each direction if the Kra Isthmus Canal-
were used could be realized. The impact of this time savings
can be assayed only in the context of a specific operational




The United States Naval policy in the Indian Ocean is
strongly oriented toward the Soviet Naval presence in the
Ocean. This leads to a contradiction, however, because the
littoral states do not want great power forces in the Ocean.
American Naval policy in the past concentrated on a low-keyed
naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In the late 1960's, however,
the military environment within the Ocean had experienced a
significant change. The heretofore dominant British forces
were being withdrawn, and the Soviet Union began naval deploy-
ments into the Ocean. Furthermore, the United States was
heavily engaged in Vietnam.
As the naval commitment in Vietnam ebbed in the early 1970' s,
the United States could devote more naval resources to the Indian
Ocean. Aircraft carrier task forces began making periodic
patrols into the Ocean, and a communications station was estab-
lished on Diego Garcia. United States involvement continued
with the decision to expand the Diego Garcia facility into a
regular operating base to provide logistical and maintainence
support to deployed units into the Indian Ocean.
These recent United States Naval developments in this area
appear to represent an escalation of U.S. efforts. Not only
does a U.S. Naval escalation challenge the Soviet Union in the
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Indian Ocean, but also the littoral nations who strongly oppose
great power navies in the Indian Ocean. Future U.S. Naval
policies with respect to the Indian Ocean must consider the
effects these policies will have on bcth the Soviet Union and
also the littoral nations.
The Soviet Union possesses a threat potential in the Indian
Ocean. While their deployed forces in the Ocean are not of
overpowering strength, they have established considerable
support from within the littoral, and have a far greater
internal Indian Ocean support capability. Moreover, the expand-
ing role of the Soviet Navy in foreign policy portends an
eventual increasing Soviet Naval presence in the Ocean. Never-
theless, at this time and in the near future, while recognizing
the threat potential of the Soviet Navy, the Soviet Naval
activity does not imply that a commensurate U.S. Naval response
is necessary. The informal reconnaissance network coupled with
satellite sensors can monitor Soviet surface ship activity
within the Ocean. A Soviet Naval buildup could be detected,
and a response from Seventh Fleet units could be initiated. A
crisis situation within the littoral could also prompt a U.S.
response, balancing the naval presence of the Soviets.
As herein described, the assumed national interests are not
influencing present U.S. Naval objectives in the Indian Ocean.
The presence of the Soviet Navy in the Ocean notwithstanding,
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the assumed national interests can best be pursued with the
Middle East Force and the augmentation capability of Seventh
Fleet naval units, without a permanent U.S. Naval buildup.
That effect that the Kra Canal would have on such an augmenta-
tion capability will be analyzed in the conclusion.
Future naval policies in the Indian Ocean will reflect the
United States perception of its national interests in the area.
This paper is presenting a national interest approach which
would cause a change in naval policy, a change that could be
politically acceptable to the littoral and militarily acceptable
by the Soviet Union, while at the same time not jeopardizing
United States national security.
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V. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Foreign policies which are pursued in specific geographic
areas will necessarily interact with the existing political
attitudes and policies of the nations within the area. These
political attitudes and policies must be understood before one
undertakes the process of examining specific foreign policies
in the political context of the geographic area. This chapter
will explore the political attitudes of the Indian Ocean
littoral with respect to the environment in which American
foreign policy will come into contact.
Indian Ocean area nations have a strong historical back-
ground of colonialism. That this colonialism was present
until the late 1940 's has had a significant influence on the
littoral's present political attitudes. Colonialism has been
replaced by nationalism in many areas, with an emphasis on
independence from the great powers. This political orientation
is reflected in the position that the majority of littoral,
nations have taken on the presence of great power activity
within the Indian Ocean. While the area nations do not want
the intrusion of outside great power nations, there is a
strong potential for one of their own to achieve great-power
status. India continues to display political and military
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strength, and appears to be the dominant nation among the
littoral. One must be cautious, however, of the growing
military capabilities of the Arab nations, and the impact they
might have on restraining India's potential dominance of the
littoral.
This chapter will not be an exhaustive examination of all
littoral nations and their political attitudes toward great
power naval presence in the Indian Ocean. India, as the most
consistent and strongest proponent of an Indian Ocean zone of
peace, will be studied in some depth. Other littoral nations,
influential in foreign policy and relative military strength,
will be examined in lesser detail.
Two basic concepts will be frequently used: "nonalignment"
and "zone of peace." The nonalignment concept differs from
zone of peace, or neutrality of the Indian Ocean, in that the
former is in reference to outside power commitments or alliances
with a littoral nation, while the latter proposes the. absence
of foreign warships in the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Ocean is unique in that it does not have an
established great-power on its shores. The absence of any
great power, coupled with the littoral attitude of maintaining
a zone of peace in the Ocean, are strong factors which make
up the littoral attitude to foreign naval presence. India
views itself as the dominant littoral power. Their attitude
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towards a foreign naval presence in the Indian Ocean does not
necessarily relfect the attitudes of the other littoral nations,
nor does it direct the attitudes of these states.
A. INDIA
1. Colonialism
The history of India before the Western colonial expedi-
tions appeared in the Indian sub-continent was rich in provincial
rivalries and religious conflicts between Hindus and Muslims.
By the 17th century the Europeans had firmly ensconced themselves
in the Indian Ocean area. In 1640, the English East India Com-
pany established itself in Madras, India. Other European
colonial nations accompanied the British into the ocean area,
including the Dutch, Danes, and French. During the eighteenth
century there was considerable British-French rivalry in South
India for dominance of the area.
The English East India Company would be the vehicle
through which the British would gain control of the Indian
sub-continent. By the end of the eighteenth century the British
had occupied most higher level administrative positions, and
the Indian Army Officer corps was entirely British. "Indians
thought it natural for a large number of offices to go to the
British, but they were irked by their own total exclusion.
They actively resented the excuse later put forward that it
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was on grounds of inefficiency. This was a sore point in Indo-
British relations into the twentieth century,"^ It is in this
era of the beginnings of British colonialism in India that the
present Indian attitude towards nonalignment and great power
presence was founded.
It can be effectively argued that the Indian attitudes
of today with respect to great power presence in the Indian
Ocean area, and the policy of nonalignment, was strongly
affected by the British colonial rule up to 1947. The British
Empire did not promote national identity and development, for
these attitudes, if sufficiently strong, could enable a colony
to break away from the empire. Moreover, the relationships
between the British and the colonies were not such to encourage
technological achievement or cultural improvement, but rather
a relationship strongly based on economic exploitation.
The penetration of Western cultural thought and practices
into the predominantly Hindu-Muslim oriented culture further
eroded the national identity of India. Although the British
made significant improvements in many facets of Indian life,
there was little regard for the preservation of Indian customs
and institutions. Indian nationalism was rooted in this
British colonial era, and gathered strength over the period of
"^Percival Spear, India (Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press, 1961), p. 205.
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British colonial rule. Anil Seal, in his book The Emergence
of Indian Nationalism , supports this principle. "Although
British rule sharpened the competitive conditions in which
they grew, the nationalist movements in India were not the
creation of nationalism. Their development was so leisurely
that the search for their genesis might be pushed back to the
i93
early decades of the nineteenth century." 7
The consummate effort of the Indian nationalism was
the independence of the Indian sub-continent from British rule
in 1947. While the nationalist movements were slowly maturing
during the term of British colonial rule, these movements of
themselves did not solely bring about India's independence.
"The United Kingdom, emerging greatly weakened from World War
Two, was under mounting pressure from nationalists in India
and elsewhere. Leaders of the Labor government, who had long
supported Indian aspirations for self-government, decided it
was no longer feasible or desirable to rule India.
"
y^
The Indian nationalism movement was capped by India's
independence from Great Britain. Attitudes of national identity
and independence do not in themselves shape the foreign policies
93Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge
The University Press, 1968), p. 22.
William J. Barnds , India
a
JPak is tan, and the Great Powers
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 3.
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that will be part of India's international relations. British
colonialism left a "bitter-sweet" taste in Indian thought.
British rule in India did a great deal of good for India. The
security of India's northern borders was adroitly maintained
by the British. Political institutions were introduced which
greatly enhanced internal political stability. Notable technol
ogical advances were achieved, especially in the area of
manufacturing of export products and exploitation of raw
materials for export. Nonetheless, the bitterness of British
rule over the Indian sub-continent and the suppression of
India's national identity strongly influenced India's political
attitudes toward nonalignment and neutralization of the Indian
Ocean.
2 . Nonalignment
"Free India's nonalignment, a phenomenon distinct from
isolationism, non-commitment, neutrality, neutralization,
unilateralism and non- involvement , is a course of foreign
policy arising from the attitude of non-acquiescence
in the bi-polarization of world politics. The bi-
polarization of world politics, crystallizing in the
cold war, has become as clear as it is today only after
the Second World War. But its process, remaining
largely under-current, was at work following the
Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 until after the end
of the Second World War. 95
95Deva Narayan Mallik, The Developmen t of Non-Alignment in




India's policy of nonalignment began soon after they
had gained their independence. Their attitudes toward the
bi-polar, superpower-dominated cold war of the early 1950 's
was viewed in the context of their past history of colonialism.
"The cold war means to the West a struggle for the survival of
a certain way of life; to India it means a most inconsistent
and exasperating insistence on the settling of Western problems
on other people's soil."" The policy of nonalignment was not
then directed at a foreign military presence in the Indian
Ocean. Rather, it was an open pronouncement to both the Soviet
Union and the United States that India would maintain its own
international identity and pursue its own foreign policy
objectives
.
The British, meanwhile, were gradually reducing their
military assets east of Suez, and thus their ability to exert
substantial influence in this area. There was no move by the
great power navies to establish a naval presence in the once
British-dominated Indian Ocean. India had to contend with
the great powers in various other ways however, involving
political alignments during the time period . The Indian Ocean
could remain a zone of peace, not because India successfully
kept foreign navies out, but rather because the foreign navies
did not wish to operate there.






India's foreign policies following independence were
largely constructed on the framework built by Jawarharlal Nehru
in the mid- twentieth century. "India's foreign policy attracted
worldwide attention, mainly because a large and important country
was developing a policy independent of the two power blocs then
forming. Nehru felt his most important task following
independence was that of nation building. This involved con-
siderably more than technological advancement and economic
growth. Nehru faced the challenge of nation building in a
post war world of bi-polarization, a condition which he felt
was not conducive to the tasks at hand.
"Unless there was peace in the world, the task of nation-
building, difficult in the best of circumstances, would
be impossible. 'Without peace,' Nehru said, 'all our
dreams are vanished and reduced to ashes.' The desire
for world peace was no Indian monopoly, though India's
spokesmen at times seemed to suggest this. They took
the position, however, that there was a basic difference
between their policy and that of most other powers,
especially those aligned on either side in the cold
war. Power politics was the cause of wars, Nehru held,
and continued reliance on this unsavory and discredited
method could lead the world into another and more
terrible war. India would refuse to play the game,
and would not jo5_n either block."""
The concepts of nonalignment , nurtured during the 30
years preceeding independence, emerged as a keystone of Free









solidify into reality in the years following independence.
The policy of nonalignment has been severely tested and greatly
stretched, but it has retained a prominent place in India's
foreign policy of today.
3. A Zone of Peace
India's foreign policy in the Indian Ocean reflects
the Indian leaders' perceived national interests. The concept
of nonalignment, if rigorously followed, would encourage a
political environment favorable to India's pursuit of national
identity and purpose. It is difficult, however, to disentangle
those aspects of foreign policy which are derived from non-
alignment, and those which are the results of India's aspirations
to dominate the littoral. Whatever their origin, both the
elements of nonalignment and littoral dominance have a common
goal-- that of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace,
free from the presence of great power navies.
India's quest to maintain a zone of peace in the Ocean
was in large part supported by the presence of the British
navy in the Indian Ocean. As the British began reducing their
commitments east of Suez in the late 1960's, and during the
twenty-year period following India's independence when the
British reduced their naval forces in this area to virtually
nothing, a naval vacuum developed. The great powers following
the War did not immediately seek to fill this vacuum.
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Although neither great power introduced a substantial
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, they each had separate
reasons. The United States had a large naval capability follow-
ing India's independence, but did not attach a high priority to
U.S. national interests in the Ocean. The Soviet Union's naval
strength after the Second World War was small and coastal-
defense oriented. It did not have the capability for out-of-
area deployments.
1968 was a pivotal year in the naval history of the
Indian Ocean, when the Soviet Navy conducted their first deploy-
ment into the Ocean. "The initial deployment was from 22 March
to 15 July 1968. A detachment from the Pacific Fleet comprising
a Sverdlov, a Kashin, and a Krupjyj , together with tankers
entered the Indian Ocean on 22 March.""" The Soviet force
visited the following ports: Madras, Bombay, Mogadishu, Umm
Qasr, Basra, Karachi, Bandar Abbas, Berenice, Aden, and
Colombo. 100
The Soviet deployment was a significant step in the
naval relationship of the Indian Ocean forces. The major combat-
ants included a cruiser and two relatively modern destroyers.
99Michael MccGuire, ed. , Soviet Naval Developments (New




This naval force, far from the coastal waters of the Soviet
homeland, received wide exposure in the littoral. Not only
can this first Soviet deployment be viewed as a show of the
flag, but also as a show to the littoral the new nature of
Soviet naval technology and their capability to undertake
extended out-of-area operations.
There are indications that the Indians received some
advanced notice of the Soviet naval actions. Admiral Gorshkov,
the military leader of the Soviet Navy, made his first visit
to India in February 1968. Then, on 3 March 1968 it was
announced that the Indian Navy would be in complete charge of
the Indian Ocean after the final withdrawal of the British
fleet in 1971. "Most of the new equipment is expected to come
from the Soviet Union, whose naval chief, Admiral Gorshkov,
visited Indian naval establishments last month.
"
1U1
India's acceptance of naval assistance from the Soviet
Union did not mean that India would be receptive to a Soviet
naval presence in return, which was apparently forthcoming.
At the 1968 meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Groymyko, is quoted as follows:
"Equal rights at all sectors and in all spheres of activity
in the international arena, including the adoption of
measures to protect the vital interests of the Soviet
Union, its allies and friends; no discrimination in world
101I.ondon Times
,
March 4, 1968, p. 5.
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trade; extensive exchange of scientific, technological
and cultural values; freedom of navigation for our ships
and fleets, and no less than for the ships and fleets of
any other power— all this determines our possibility
and responsibility in world affairs."-*-^
This speech to the Supreme Soviet, Admiral Gorshkov's visit to
India, and the Soviet naval deployment into the Indian Ocean
project a new Soviet foreign policy emphasis, one which poten-
tially challenges the Indian concept of an Indian Ocean free
from a great power presence.
Yet, India has been firmly intent on maintaining this
apparent dichotomous foreign policy. For example, in November,
1970, India informed the United States, Russia, and Britain,
that "she would oppose any attempts by the big powers to
establish naval bases in the Indian Ocean. This would apparently
stop rumors that India might give the Soviet Union a naval base
103in the Andaman Islands."
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, visited
the Soviet Union in September 1971. "Mrs Gandhi was stated to
have reiterated that 'the area of the Indian Ocean must be a
zone of peace. ' The fact that the Soviet side was not
102James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean,"
Soviet Naval Developments
.,
ed. by Michael MccGuire (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 425.
103Peter Hazelhurst, "India Warns Powers on Naval Base,"
London Times , 20 November 1970, p. 8.
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specifically associated with this declaration suggests that
there was some disagreement over the question of a Soviet naval
presence in the Indian Ocean." A few months later, Mrs.
Gandhi stated India's foreign policy as "firmly based on the
principle of nonalignment , despite the Indian-Soviet friendship
treaty of last year." Mrs. Gandhi elaborated on the aspects
of military assistance from the Soviet Union and nonalignment
as follows: "Asked if her country felt 'obligated to demonstrate
its gratitude in any tangible way' to Moscow, which strongly
supported India during the war with Pakistan, she observed
first that India was not given 'to display gratitude in any
tangible sense for anything.'" In this same newspaper
article, Mrs. Gandhi stated that, while she hoped the Indian
Ocean region could be kept free of great power naval rivalry,
she could offer no ideas about how this could be accomplished.
Late in 1973, India and the Soviet Union concluded
another friendship treaty and a long term economic agreement.
"In a spirited defense of her involvement with Moscow, Mrs.
Gandhi said that recent agreements between the two nations did
David Bonavia, "Mrs. Ghandi and Soviet Leaders Fail to
Agree," London Times , 30 September 1971, p. 6.
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not influence her declared policy of independent judgments,
A 4 • A « «-4 ll|107assessments, decisions and actions.
The consistency of India's foreign policy since inde-
pendence strongly supports India's desire for nonalignment and
maintenance of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. This
consistency must be viewed cautiously, however, because there
can be a wide divergence between what a country says, and that
which it actually does. Although it is undocumented, one must
question the apparent one-way nature of aid and support given
to India, by both the United States and the Soviet Union. It
seems intuitively unlikely that the Soviets would do something
for nothing; and one wonders that at a propitious moment, or
during a time of military necessity, the Soviets would move
to seek naval bases or support facilities in the Indian sub-
continent.
B. THE LITTORAL AND NONALIGNMENT -ZONE OF PEACE
A review of the littoral states and their attitudes on
nonalignment and a zone of peace within the Indian Ocean will
augment India's strong attitudes on these subjects. The entire
littoral is not unified in support of the Indian position.
Furthermore, some area nations carry stronger influence than
New York Times , 1 January 1974, p. 1.
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others, thereby adding importance to their position. In order
to develop the general littoral political attitude on nonalign-
ment , a selected number of nations will be presented.
Two groups of nations exist which have followed a general
policy of zone of peace within the Indian Ocean. Malaysia,
Thailand, The Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore are joined
together in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. A
second group of littoral nations met in Lusaka, at a conference
of Nonaligned nations. Meeting at Lusaka were the Western
Indian Ocean islands, including Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles,
and the British Indian Ocean Territory. Both of these littoral
groups support a zone of peace within the Indian Ocean.
The African littoral nations are generally weaker in
political and military strength than other littoral nations,
but "on the whole, the Black African governments have welcomed
1 OR
the idea of a 'neutralized' Indian Ocean. ° These African
nations are the potential scene of great confrontations between
the United States, Soviet Union, and China, as these slowly-
developing nations advance their national identity and pursue
possible conflicting ideologies. However, their expressed
interests include a zone of peace and stability within the area.
108Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, eds., The Indian Ocean
Its Political, Economic, and Military Importance
,
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 197?.), P- xxii.
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On the Indian subcontinent, in agreement with India, are
Pakistan and Sir Lanka (formerly Ceylon). The South Asian
nations gave strong support to a resolution by the Conference
of Nonaligned nations, wherein all states agreed to "consider
and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which
Great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived
in such rivalries are excluded. "1°"
Prime Minister Bandaranaika of Sir Lanka states: "Our
concept of a Peace Zone totally excludes the intrusion of
great power conflicts into the region, with their attendant
defense systems." A Pakistani spokesman, speaking in agree-
ment, remarked: "The demand of the littoral states of the
Indian Ocean that the Cold War and military rivalry between
the Great Powers should not be injected into this area must be
respected. "**• 1
Several littoral nations require a more detailed examination
of their political attitudes. Owing to their relative naval
strength and political status, Iran, Australia, Indonesia, and
South Africa will be evaluated in the following sub-sections.
••-^Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and the Indian Ocean,"
The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic, and Military
Importance , ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 243.





Of those nations in the Middle East who have utilized
their oil resource revenues to build up national military
strength, Iran appears the strongest and most capable. Not
only is Iran buying the latest American weapon systems, but
also utilizing American training facilities in order to up-
grade the professional caliber of its military forces. It is
unlikely, however, to assume that Iran can buy its way into
great power status. Iran's present position rests on its vast
resources of crude oil. It does not possess a large land mass
nor population base. The large oil resources notwithstanding,
Iran does not possess a sufficient area and population base
to firmly establish itself as a great power. An overriding
dependence on a single natural resource to maintain an inter-
national position of strength and prestige is insecure at best.
Many international circumstances could arise which would rele-
gate crude petroleum products to second rate significance,
and therefore undermine Iran's strength.
Iran's economy is heavily dependent upon the export of
crude oil through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Pur-
suing a policy of Iranian naval strength in the Persian Gulf,
Iran seeks to establish itself as the dominant naval power in
the Gulf. However, there seems to be no such intention for
the Indian Ocean. "It is illuminating to contrast this constant
126

Iranian insistence on hegemony in the Persian Gulf with the
relative lack of statements about the Indian Ocean. "112
According to R. M. Burrell:
"...the Iranian government has come to the realistic
conclusion that the problems of oil traffic in the Indian
Ocean are over-whelmingly the concern of the Western
powers and that, although Iran as the world's largest
oil exporter has a vital interest in such matters, the
defense of those routes is presently beyond Iran's
capabilities. The emphasis is centered on the Gulf,
and there Iran feels itself to be prepared for, and
capable of, the maintenance of security and free naviga-
*-! ~~ "113txon. *-*•-*
As for the Indian Ocean, Iran has assumed the position
that the powers interested in open lines of communication
throughout the Indian Ocean can provide such security without
Iranian interference.
2. Australia
Australia's national interests clearly include the
maintenance of the lanes of communication throughout the Indian
Ocean. During the era when the British were dominant in the
Ocean, Australia, like India, had little concern for the defense
of the area. However, the British decision to conclude its
long-standing presence east of Suez in 1970 created a new
security problem for the Australians.
*--*-2r.M. Burrell, "The Indian Ocean: An Iranian Evaluation,"
The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance
,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, (New York: Praeger







Threats to sea lanes of communication within the Indian
Ocean are not likely to be based in the littoral countries.
"None of the nations bordering the Indian Ocean has either a
navy or a merchant navy of any size. India, Indonesia, and
Australia have navies of approximately equal ship strength,
Indonesia's being in a state of considerable disrepair. South
Africa is the only other state with a naval capacity. No one
nation in the region dominates the Ocean or makes a dispro-
portionate use of it." Consequently a threat to the security
of the Indian Ocean would have to come from an outside naval
power directly, or a great power in support of a littoral nation,
A foreign policy which follows a zone of peace, or
"neutralization," of the Indian Ocean would seek to eliminate
a naval power from threatening the security of the area.
Australia re-evaluated its political position following the
Soviet naval entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968. In 1973 the
Australian government modified the 1963 Australian-American
agreement on naval communications in installations on the
Northwest Cape of Australia. The Australians wanted to assume
a greater operational control over the facility. This modifica-
tion to the operational control of the joint communications
ll
^T.B. Miller, "Geopolitics and Military/Strategic Potential,"
The Indian Ocean: Its Po litical, Economic, and Military Importance
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), p. 63.
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base closely followed a communique covering talks between
Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlan and India's Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi. The two countries pledged "to work
for the creation of a 'zone of peace' in the Indian Ocean 'free
from international tensions, great power rivalry, and military
escalation.'" 11 ->
In opposition to a proposed British-American agreement
to build up military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia
in 1974, Australia reiterated its foreign policy position in
the Indian Ocean. "Australia is a member of, and has given
its firm support to, the United Nations ad hoc committee on
the Indian Ocean zone of peace and has endorsed the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations proposal for a neutrality in the
ASEAN region." 116
The position that they have taken on nonalignment and
neutralization is not unique to Australia. The idea of free
sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean greatly affects
the commerce of nations throughout the world. For this reason
alone many non-littoral nations favor a zone of peace in the
Ocean- -to remove any potential for military confrontation or
rivalries which might disrupt shipping or exert pressures on
nations using the shipping lanes.
115New York Times
,
7 June 1973, p. 31.




This strategically located archipelago controls the
major access routes to the eastern Indian Ocean. Moreover, it
has one of the largest naval forces along the littoral. In
the early 1960 's Indonesia's President Sukarno requested and
received Soviet help to develop his naval forces. During the
same period he proclaimed the "archipelago concept," which
would restrict the passage of warships through Indonesian
waters and straits. "Concern about Indonesia's potential impact
on the global strategic balance was intensified when Sukarno
announced that Indonesia was a 'comrade-in-arms' of Communist
China and part of the Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Pyonyang-Peking
axis." 117
Were it not for the 1965 downfall of Sukarno and with
it a loss of Soviet support and a reversal of Indonesia's
political orientation, the Indonesian barrier to the eastern
Indian Ocean access might have become a reality. However,
Indonesia's foreign policy now favors a stronger Western rela-
tionship. The Indonesian government tends to agree with most
littoral nations on nonalignment , but it supports a much
'Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesian Perspectives on the Indian
Oc ean , " The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic, and Military
Importance
,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 225.
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different approach to great power naval forces in the Indian
Ocean.
"The spirit of realism that now pervades Indonesian
foreign policy has extended to a rejection of the idea of
a 'neutralized' Indian Ocean. Although the policy is
praised as ideal it is recognized as impractical. The
government in Djakarta has realized that, although
Indonesia has great interests in the Ocean, it is at the
moment too weak to exercise an effective defense of them,
The Ceylonese idea of excluding the great powers from
the Ocean is seen as impossible because these powers are
already present there and are unlikely to give up the
position that they now maintain. From Djakarta's point
of view the real danger lies in one great power achieving
exclusive hegemony in the Ocean and being able to improve
unilaterally its own will. ,f -"-°
Whereas the majority of the littoral desire a zone of peace, free
from great power presence, Indonesia, perhaps more realistically,
suggests a balance of great powers to offset each other. While
this approach might maintain peace in the Indian Ocean, it will
contribute to escalating tensions and military hardware build-
ups, only to threaten the concepts of a "zone of peace."
4. South Africa
South Africa, like most of the developing littoral states
is heavily dependent upon an ocean-oriented trade organization.
The security provided by British naval forces in the area prior
to their reduction beginning after World War Two greatly pro-
tected South Africa's sea-based lanes of communication. This
118Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, eds., The Indian
Ocean: Its Political , Economic, and Military Importance , ( New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 200.
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sense of security was sharply jolted, not only in South Africa,
but also throughout the littoral, by the 1968 Soviet deployment
into the area.
South Africa commands a major point of entry into the
Indian Ocean. This route south of the Cape of Good Hope be-
comes even more important with the closure of the Suez Canal.
The excellent port facilities in South Africa are strategically
located along the Atlantic-Indian Ocean trade route, and anyone
desiring to control the Indian Ocean would place this country
on a high priority. The former British naval base at Simons town
is the "only permanent modern naval base backed by a modern
industrial community and a stable government in the vast area
stretching from Australia to South America. This naval
base can be available to the West if required. While South
Africa does not condone the Soviet naval operations in the
Indian Ocean, neither does it believe that a policy of non-
alignment is appropriate. The South African relations with
Western nations support a balance of force policy in place of
a zone of peace for the Indian Ocean.
11QLJ
- P. Smit, "South Africa and the Indian Ocean: The South
African Viewpoint," The Indian Ocean: Its Polit ical, Economic ,
and Military Importance
.,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M.
Burrell, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 285.
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5. Summary of Littoral Attitudes
The political attitudes of the more prominant littoral
naval powers favor, at least in the general sense, a zone of
peace in the Indian Ocean. Some nations favor a balance of the
existing great power naval forces, while others support a
complete neutrality within the Indian Ocean.
Those littoral nations not addressed heretofore can be
categorized into three groups. Some of the newly developing
littoral states have established some form of relations with
external powers. These nations have provided in the past port
facilities for foreign naval units. Whereas their own political
strength is limited relative to the stronger littoral states,
they can offer necessary shore-based support facilities for
logistical and maintenance requirements. These nations do not
follow the rest of the littoral in pursuing a zone of peace or
neutrality in the Indian Ocean.
A second group of littoral nations foresee the apparent
security inherent in a "neutral" Indian Ocean. "It is to be
noted that some nonaligned states in the coastal areas of the
Indian Ocean are proposing that the maintenance of security
in the Ocean should be left primarily to the efforts of the
regional coastal states."^ 2 This group of states is in basic
120Shinsaku Hogen, "The Present State of the Indian Ocean,"
The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Mili tary Importance,
ed. by Alvin J. Cottrell~and R.M. Burrell
,
(New Yoirk: Praeger
Publishers, 1972), p. 389.
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agreement with India in the nonalignment and neutralization
concepts of their foreign policy.
The third group of area states are concerned about the
presence of great power navies in the Indian Ocean, but also
recognize their already established presence. This group of
states prefers to advocate a balance of power approach, with
the belief that the opposing forces can be equalized so that
no foreign naval force can claim dominance in the area. This
approach is realistically oriented, for the Soviet Union and
the United States both have established deployed forces in the
area, and both firmly adhere to the principal of international
freedom of the seas. However, this approach also encourages
the bui.ldup of tensions and naval hardware, as one side
attempts to maintain equality with the other. If it can be
said that this littoral group is realistically reacting to
the problem, it can also be argued that this is a short term
solution to a complex situation.
The stronger littoral nations agree on the desirability
of a zone of peace within the Indian Ocean. Those littoral
nations with lesser political and military influence generally
support this neutrality concept. There exist a few littoral
nations who do not share the idea of a zone of peace, and who
overtly cooperate with any of the great powers of convenience.
Owing to the dominance of India in the littoral, the prevailing
134

littoral attitude supports nonalignment and a zone of peace
within the Indian Ocean.
C. INDIA AND LEADERSHIP OF THE LITTORAL
Of those nations which border the Indian Ocean, India
possesses the greatest potential for achieving great power
status. The Indian government's commitment to a policy of
nonalignment and the neutrality of the Indian Ocean has strongly
persisted since the Indian independence. By combining these
two concepts, one might speculate that India would become the
controlling agent within the Indian Ocean. "Since India and
Pakistan are among the largest and most powerful of the coastal
states in the Indian Ocean and are with sizable naval forces,
these two countries, perhaps together with Ceylon, will have
to 'play important roles in shaping the future destiny of the
Indian Ocean." 121
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has repeatedly objected
to great power naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Although
India has received considerable military, economic, and tech-
nological assistance from the Soviet Union in recent years, by
no means does India acquiesce to a change in its policy of
nonalignment and neutralization. It may be unrealistic to







the Indian Ocean, and any such act would violate current inter-
national freedom of the seas agreements. However, India has
been in the vanguard of the zone of peace movement in the Indian
Ocean, and will continue to lead the littoral with ever-
increasing strength.
It is merely speculative to predict that India will achieve
a great power status. The immense population base, and the
large land mass, together with the growing technological base,
substantiate India's great power potential. The international
exhibition of India's ability to utilize fissionable material
strongly suggests India's self-perceived position in the
international political realm.
Within the littoral nations, no political orientation
exists which binds all the nations together in any common
position on nonalignment or zone of peace. India can uni-
laterally claim a position of leadership of the littoral, but
no allegience will be necessarily credited to India's pro-
claimed dominance. In order for India to politically dominate
the Indian Ocean littoral, it must firmly establish itself as
either the dominant power in the area, or as the champion




The political environment within the Indian Ocean is fairly
well united in the concept of a zone of peace. The underlying
reasons for this policy differ among littoral nations; and the
degree to which these area nations pursue this foreign policy
varies as well. Nonetheless, the general political attitude of
the littoral is based on a desire to keep great power naval
forces from maintaining a force presence in the Indian Ocean.
The alternative approach, adopted by some littoral nations,
recognizes the already established presence of the great power
naval units in the Indian Ocean, and supports a balance of
great power naval forces to maintain an equilibrium in the area.
India is the strongest and most visible proponent of a zone
of peace in the Indian Ocean. This, coupled with India's
potential for great power status, awards India a strong leader-
ship position among the Indian Ocean littoral. It cannot be
assumed that India can force its ideas of nonalignment and zone
of peace on all littoral states, but it can project these ideas
to the international political environment with substantial
force and commitment, irregardless of dissenting littoral
nations. Consequently, any foreign policy that requires a
foreign naval presence in the Indian Ocean will not be favorably




VI. EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESIS
This thesis has analyzed a foreign policy approach to meet
national interests in the Indian Ocean. Specific national
interests for the United States were assumed, in order to
examine the appropriateness and applicability of one specific
foreign policy to meet those interests. The assumed national
interests took into account the Soviet naval forces, and con-
cluded that the Soviet fleet maintained in the Indian Ocean
does not threaten United States security interests at this time.
Moreover, the assumed interests reflect the basic ideals of the
Nixon Doctrine, wherein increased participation of littoral
nations for their collective defense, augmented by U.S. forces
only when necessary, would replace permanently stationed U.S.
forces in the area, other than the Middle East Force.
A foreign policy oriented toward these national interests
was presented as a potential alternative to present and future
U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean. A canal across Thailand's
Isthmus of Kra, through which the United States naval forces
would have free and immediate access, could possibly provide
the United States with a marginally better capability than
existing passages through the Barrier to respond to situations
in the Indian Ocean which threaten United States security
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objectives. Furthermore, the Kra Canal could provide a limited
improvement in logistic support over the currently used alterna-
tive routes into the Ocean.
A. ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS
1. Foreign Policy in Support of National Interests
The foreign policy as proposed possesses a basic
similarity with the current foreign policy in the Indian Ocean;
the difference being the access route through the Indonesia-
Malay Barrier. The assumed national interests rely on a low-
key United States presence in the Ocean, with the capability
to respond to the area when necessary. The Kra Canal would
reduce transit time to the Ocean from the South China Sea by
approximately thirty-five fours, based on a twenty knot speed
of advance.
One distinct advantage that the Kra Canal would offer
to transiting naval units into the Indian Ocean is its immunity
to the political nature of the Malacca Straits, and the possi-
bility of restrictions on warships transiting the Straits.
The time required to by-pass the Indonesian Archipelago to the
east in response to an Indian Ocean situation would be detri-




Current and Proposed U.S. Indian Ocean Policy
Present United States Naval policy in the Indian Ocean
emphasizes a "low-key" approach. A token U.S. Naval force,
consisting of three ships, is permanently stationed in Bahrain,
and primarily serves to show the American flag across the Ocean.
This U.S. force is augmented by occasional deployments of units
from the Seventh Fleet, including aircraft carrier task forces.
Future United States naval policy includes a proposal to
construct a logistical support base on the island of Diego
Garcia, located near the center of the Ocean. This base could
be used to support the periodically deployed units from the
Seventh Fleet, as well as serve as an operating base for a
permanently deployed task force.
The proposed foreign policy would maintain the present
level of U.S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean. It would not
mean the establishment of an operating base within the Indian
Ocean, and it would encourage the low-key presence of U.S. naval
activity in the Ocean.
3
.
Indian Ocean Political Environment
Maintenance of a zone of peace within the Indian Ocean
together with an adherence to nonalignment are dominant attitudes
among the Indian Ocean littoral. The littoral negatively
responds to the presence of foreign great power warships in the
Ocean, and denounces any attempt to establish permanent operating
facilities along the littoral.
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The proposed foreign policy, although not abstaining
from U.S. Naval activity in the Indian Ocean, does not represent
a significant U.S. Naval presence. The low visibility of naval
activity violates the absolute concept of an Indian Ocean zone
of peace. However, it represents the least offensive policy
to the littoral, while at the same time supporting U.S.
security objectives in the Ocean.
The Isthmus of Kra itself is part of the Indian Ocean
littoral. A canal similar to that of the Panama Canal, with
a foreign power possessing sovereignty of the Canal Zone,
would be similar to having a foreign base along the littoral.
The proposed policy encompasses United States support for the
Canal's construction, with unconditional access rights, rather
than a U.S. owned and operated canal.
4. Foreign Policy Feasibility
The proposed foreign policy presupposes that a canal
can be constructed across the Isthmus of Kra. The existence
of the Suez and Panama Canals are indisputable evidence that
such a canal using conventional construction techniques can be
accomplished. The large expense involved, together with the
lengthy construction time, place severe constraints on the
canal's potential. Canal construction using nuclear techniques
is feasible, and would greatly reduce the construction time,
although the expense would be equally large.
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It is questionable whether the economic benefits that
would accrue from a canal across the Kra Isthmus would sustain
the canal effort. As the merchant vessels increase in size
and cargo-carrying capacity, increased transit distances around
the Indonesia Archipelago are compensated by the increased
capacities. Military applicability of the canal, even if all
other passages through the Indonesia-Malay Barrier are closed
to military use, is not sufficient to warrant canal construction.
There exists today the technological capability to
construct a canal across the Isthmus of Kra. At the present
time, and in the foreseeable future, it seems unrealistic to
consider any condition which would stimulate efforts to con-
struct the canal. However, there may occur at some future time
considerations that would substantiate the construction of a
Kra Canal.
An additional consideration is the acceptability of
a canal to Thailand. Owing to the limited canal construction
capability possessed by Thailand, there would likely be foreign
technical and economic support. Thailand's political orienta-
tion appears to be changing away from the Western camp. That
Thailand has refused to allow U.S. airborne reconnaissance of
the Indian Ocean from Thai airbases suggests that Thailand
would not support U.S. Naval activity in the Indian Ocean
through the Kra Canal. Thailand's respect for China's security
142

interests in Southeast Asia, coupled with the absence of a
threat from naval activity within the Indian Ocean, indicate
a lack of Thai cooperation with any major power in the
construction of the canal.
5. Impact of the Foreign Policy
The proposed foreign policy seems to support the assumed
national interests in the Indian Ocean. However, there are
minimal differences between this proposed policy, and the
current policy using the Straits of Malacca to gain entry into
the Indian Ocean. The reduced transit distance is not signifi-
cant in view of the speed capability of combatant and logistic
units. The low-key U.S. Naval presence in the Ocean can be
maintained using the Straits as well as the Kra Canal. A
U.S. supported Kra Canal, motivated by military considerations,
is impractical and unnecessary if transit through the Straits
by U.S. warships can be maintained.
B. CONCLUSION
The hypothesis of this paper is: The United States should
support the construction of the proposed Kra Canal so that
Seventh Fleet naval units could rapidly respond to political-
military activities within the Indian Ocean, in support of
American national interests, as an alternative to stationing a




An analysis of this hypothesis with the information provided
in this paper, indicates that American national interests, as
herein defined, can be supported by the absence of a permanent
operating force or operating base other than the Middle East
Force, provided naval units from outside the area are readily
available to respond when necessary in the Indian Ocean. Further-
more, this policy is most consistent with the political attitudes
of the Indian Ocean littoral.
It is concluded, however, that this hypothesis should be
rejected, in that the Kra Canal would not provide the United
States with an access route through the Indonesia -Malay Barrier
significantly better than the passages now in existence.
United States naval forces assigned to the Seventh Fleet
have been used to conduct periodic operations in the Indian
Ocean, either to acquire operating experience, or in response
to specific events in the area. These naval units transiting
into the Ocean have utilized the Straits of Malacca. By way of
a canal through the Isthmus of Kra, Seventh Fleet units could
save approximately 700 miles between the South China Sea and
the Indian Ocean.
The effect of the Kra Canal on Seventh Fleet response, with
the alternative to the canal being the Malacca Straits, is a
reduction in response, time of some thirty- five hours. On a
transit between the Philipp5.ne Islands and the mid-Indian Ocean,
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a distance of approximately 2,800 miles through the Straits,
the Kra Canal route would offer a twenty percent reduction in
time and distance. Assuming a speed of advance of twenty knots,
transit time between the Philippines and mid-Indian Ocean is
almost six days. In the event that a crisis situation occurs
in the Indian Ocean, the lengthy transit time would preclude the
immediacy of a naval response. Use of the Kra Canal, while
reducing transit time by thirty-five hours, would not appreciably
improve response time in the face of a crisis situation. In
this scenario the Kra Canal, while offering some advantages in
reduced transit time, would not be of sufficient scope to warrant
its construction.
Another scenario, one which is less likely to occur, would
have the Indonesia-Malay Barrier politically closed to foreign
warships by Indonesian and Malaysian claims to territorial
waters of the Malacca Straits. This scenario substantially
increases the relevancy of the Kra Canal to military operations
within the Indian Ocean. It is in this context that the Kra
Canal would be a viable policy alternative to be seriously
considered. However, the United States has strongly supported
its position on the international or territorial status of the.
Straits, rejecting the Indonesian-Malaysian claims. One aspect
of U.S. national interests in this area is the maintenance of
free and open surface and air lines of communication throughout
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the area of the Indian Ocean. Any attempt by Indonesia or
Malaysia to prohibit the passage of warships through the Straits
would provoke a strong and overwhelming U.S. response.
Beyond the insignificant impact that the canal would have
on U.S. naval response to the Indian Ocean, exists the considera-
tion of Thailand-United States relations. Thailand has allowed
the United States to conduct air operations for the protection
of national governments in Indochina. Thailand realizes the
potential threat to its security from insurgent movements from
within Indochina. Thailand does not recognize a threat to its
security from within the Indian Ocean, and has refused to allow
U.S. reconnaissance patrols of the Indian Ocean from Thai bases.
This latter policy is partially motivated by Thailand's desire
to refrain from making provocative gestures to China. A canal
which would grant a military advantage to a great power navy
for operations in the Indian Ocean would be unacceptable to
China. It is unlikely that Thailand would take such a move.
From the above considerations, therefore, it can be con-
cluded that a canal across the Isthmus of Kra would not signifi-
cantly improve United States naval response and logistic support
in the pursuit of U.S. national interests in the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, the political climate in Thailand is not accommodating
to foreign interest or control in any Kra Canal project. The
present level of U.S. naval activity within the Indian Ocean,
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including the Middle East Force and occasional visits by Seventh
Fleet units, augmented when necessary by a carrier task force
through the Straits of Malacca, is considered sufficient to meet
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